1 - TURNIPSEED

4/23/2009 9:10:49 AM

The Silver Anniversary of the United States’
Exclusive Economic Zone:
Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse,
and the Possibility of a
Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine*
Mary Turnipseed+
Stephen E. Roady++
Raphael Sagarin+++
Larry B. Crowder++++

Sustainably managing marine ecosystems has proved nearly impossible,
with few success stories. Ecosystem management failures largely stem from the
traditional sector-by-sector, issue-by-issue approach to managing ocean-borne
activities—an approach that is fundamentally unable to keep pace with the
dynamics of coupled human, ecological and oceanographic systems. In the
United States today there are over twenty federal agencies and thirty-five
coastal states and territories operating under dozens of statutory authorities
shaping coastal and ocean policy. Among marine ecologists and policy experts
there is an emerging consensus that a major overhaul in U.S. ocean
governance is necessary. This Article suggests that the public trust doctrine—
an ancient legal concept that is already incorporated in U.S. state coastal
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laws—can uniquely provide a unifying concept for U.S. federal ocean
governance.
Though the public trust concept can be located in the legal systems of
many countries, it robustly manifests in the United States, where it has
historically protected the public’s rights to fishing, navigation, and commerce
in and over navigable waterways and tidal waters. In its most basic form, the
doctrine obliges governments to manage common natural resources, the body
of the trust, in the best interest of their citizens, the beneficiaries of the trust.
Today the public trust doctrine is integral to the protection of coastal
ecosystems and beach access in many states and has even made its way into
state constitutions. It would be simple, and seemingly logical, to assume that
the same fiduciary responsibility of states to protect public trust uses of their
waters extends to all marine resources within the United States’ 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However an artificial line has been drawn
around state waters, and the legal authority and responsibility of the U.S.
government to protect public trust resources in the vast space of its EEZ (the
largest of any country on earth) have never been fully and expressly
established. Securing the place of the public trust doctrine in U.S. federal
oceans management would be valuable, given the immense pressure to exploit
EEZ resources, the failure of the current regulatory approach, improved
scientific understanding of the interconnected nature of ocean ecosystems, and
the growing demand for sustainable management of ocean resources.
This Article will outline the development of states’ public trust doctrines;
discuss the expansion of U.S. sovereignty over its neighboring ocean waters
during the twentieth century; analyze possible avenues for expanding the
doctrine to federal waters; and consider how a federal public trust doctrine
could clarify some specific emerging issues in U.S. oceans management. At the
heart of our analysis lie three questions: (1) does a federal public trust doctrine
exist; (2) if so, can we rightfully extend it to include the entirety of the U.S.
ocean waters; and (3) could the doctrine provide the missing catalyst for
federal agencies to manage the use of U.S. ocean resources in a coordinated,
sustainable fashion?
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INTRODUCTION

It is a fact, as singular as it was unexpected in the jurisprudence of our
state, that the taking [of] a few bushels of oysters . . . should involve in it
questions momentous in their nature, as well as in their magnitude . . . and
embracing, in their investigation, the laws of nations and of England, the
relative rights of sovereign and subjects, as well as the municipal
regulations of our own country.1
U.S. ocean policy today is less than the sum of its parts.2
The United States and its coastal states exercise jurisdiction over more of
the world’s oceans than any other country.3 Because of its vast coastlines and
territorial holdings in the South Pacific and Caribbean, the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) covers 4.4 million square miles, larger than the
combined area of the fifty states.4 That the United States is responsible for the
management of such a large volume of the world’s oceans and its resources is
significant on a global scale—achieving effective oceans management is one of
the central challenges to global sustainability. Oceans cover 71 percent of the
earth’s surface, and recent advances in marine and earth science highlight the
crucial role oceans play in providing ecosystem services, including climate
moderation.5
1. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 79 (1821).
2. BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT W. KNECHT, THE FUTURE OF U.S. OCEAN POLICY: CHOICES
FOR THE NEW CENTURY

7 (2000).
ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL
REPORT unnumbered introductory page (2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/
documents/full_color_rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf.
4. Id. Territorial holdings in the South Pacific include the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,
Wake Island, Midway Islands, Howland Island, Baker Island, American Samoa, Johnston Atoll, Palmyra
Atoll, Kingman Reef, and Jarvis Island. Id. U.S. territories in the Caribbean include Navassa Island,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id.
5. Daniel Pauly & Jacqueline Alder, Marine Fisheries, in MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATES AND TRENDS 479–81 (Rashid
Hassan, Robert Scholes, & Neville Ash, eds. 2005), available at http://www.millenniumassessment.
org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf; see also KAREN L. MCLEOD ET AL., SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS
STATEMENT ON MARINE ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT 2 (2005), available at http://
compassonline.org/pdf_files/EBM_Consensus_Statement_v12.pdf (Ecosystems are defined as “dynamic
complex[es] of plants, animals, microbes, and physical environmental features that interact with one

3. U.S. COMM’N
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The diversity of current and potential uses of U.S. coastal and ocean
waters—fishing, aquaculture, oil and mineral exploitation, energy generation,
shipping, defense, and recreation—is mirrored by the plethora of statutory
authorities6 and agencies7 that regulate them. This endemic fragmentation of
another. Humans are an integral part of ecosystems, marine and terrestrial.”) (emphasis omitted); see
also infra notes 331–339 and accompanying text for explanation and examples of “ecosystem services.”
6. According to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, at least 140 federal laws shape coastal
and ocean policy, including the following: Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106
(2006); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships of 1980, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1912 (2006) (current version
known as the Maritime Pollution Prevention Act of 2008); Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative
Management Act of 1993, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5108 (2006); Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act of
1984, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1551–5158 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006); Clean Vessel
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006); Coastal
Barrier Resources Act of 1982, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3510 (2006); Coastal Wetland Planning, Protection
and Restoration Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3951–3956 (2006); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1456 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628 (2006); Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000, 16 U.S.C. §§
6401–6409 (2006); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1473 (2006);
Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2006); Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§
1531–1544 (2006); Estuary Restoration Act of 2000, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2909 (2006); Food Security
Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1631–1638 (2006); Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101–624, 104 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891 (2006); Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423 (2006); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
and 33 U.S.C.); Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act of 2002, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1905
(2006); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006); Nonindigenous
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 and National Invasive Species Act of 1996, 16
U.S.C. §§ 4701–4751 (2006); National Oceanographic Partnership Program of 1997, 10 U.S.C. §§
7901–7903 (2006); National Sea Grant College Program Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1121–1131 (2006);
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101–9168 (2006); Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and Submerged Lands Act of
1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1356 (2006); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401–467 (2006);
Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2348 (2006). U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN
POLICY, supra note 3, at D8–D14.
7. There are over twenty federal agencies and departments that oversee various coastal and ocean
activities and uses. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 78, 113, D5–D7. They include the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Minerals Management
Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Parks Service, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and other agencies within the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice,
Labor, State, and Transportation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Many federal
commissions, committees, and councils also play important roles in the creation and enforcement of
coastal and ocean policies; they include: Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force; Artic Research
Commission, Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, Coral Reef Task Force, Council on
Environmental Quality, Estuary Habitat Restoration Council, Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Gulf
States Marine Fisheries Commission, Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture, Marine Mammal
Commission, National Invasive Species Council, National Ocean Research Leadership Council,
National Science and Technology Council, Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission, and Regional
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governance is not just use-based, but also place-based. The oceans of the
United States comprise both state and federally regulated waters; the latter are
divided into three separate regimes. States have jurisdiction over and regulate
most activities within the submerged lands and waters that stretch from their
coastlines out to 3 or 9 nautical miles (nm).8 The federal government has
authority over the territorial sea, which lies seaward of state water boundaries
out to 12 nm,9 and the EEZ, which spans the area between 12 and 200 nm off
the coasts of the U.S. and its territories.10 Within the EEZ is the contiguous
zone, a thin belt of ocean positioned between 12 to 24 nm from U.S. shores,
with respect to which the federal government has expanded rights as compared
to the rest of the EEZ.11 Underlying the differences in regulation, management,
and jurisdiction among the various types of U.S. ocean waters are fundamental
distinctions in ownership. State governments have title to submerged lands
under their tidal waters, which they hold in a public trust for their citizens.12
Over the territorial sea, the federal government has full sovereignty, while over
the EEZ, it possesses “sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” which impart
something less than full sovereignty.13
This uneven and uncoordinated approach to ocean governance is not
without consequences; inter alia, the ecosystem services provided by our
oceans are at risk. High population growth and development in U.S. coastal
areas have impeded responsible watershed management and coastal planning.14
As a result, agricultural and urban runoff, stormwater and sewage overflows,
discharges from wastewater treatment facilities, and atmospheric deposition of
nutrients and toxic chemicals have degraded U.S. coastal waters, leading to
beach closures, harmful algal blooms, the degradation of wetlands, and
contamination of sediments and seafood species.15 Inconsistent and inadequate

Fishery Management Councils (Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, Mid-Atlantic, New England, North Pacific,
Pacific, South Atlantic, and Western Pacific).
8. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 states that jurisdiction may “extend[] from the coast line
[no] more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or [no] more than
three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico.” 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (2006). A marine league is equal to
three nautical miles.
9. See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989).
10. See Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22, 23 (1983); see also C. Fowler & E. Treml, Building a
Marine Cadastral Information System for the United States—A Case Study, 25 COMPUTERS, ENV’T &
URBAN SYS. 493, 497 (2001).
11. See Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (declaring that within the
contiguous zone, the United States reserves the rights to enforce its “customs, fiscal, immigration, [and]
sanitary laws within its territory [and] territorial sea[s]”).
12. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S.
469, 475 (1988).
13. See infra Part II.B. See also Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777; Proclamation No.
5030, 3 C.F.R. at 22.
14. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 38–42.
15. See id.; see generally Benjamin S. Halpern, et al., Evaluating and Ranking the Vulnerability of
Global Marine Ecosystems to Anthropogenic Threats, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1301 (2007)
(analyzing “anthropogenic stressors” on marine ecosystems).
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management has allowed overfishing and the destruction of coastal and ocean
habitats, including wetlands, seagrass beds, mangroves, and kelp and coral reef
ecosystems. In turn, these practices have caused declines in fish populations
and the fisheries (and coastal communities) that depend on them.16 Seismic and
noise pollution, oil spills, and habitat damage have accompanied the
exploration for and exploitation of oil, gas, minerals, sand, and gravel.17
Finally, climate change brings additional complications to this quagmire: signs
of sea level rise, acidification, and ocean warming, recurrent coral bleaching
events, and changes in ocean ecosystem productivity and the ranges of marine
animals are already apparent.18
The implications of climate change aside, of all the human impacts on the
oceans, unsustainable fishing practices have been responsible for some of the
most harmful effects on ocean ecosystems.19 Globally, wild-capture fisheries
have been declining since the late 1980s,20 and, despite many attempts at
sustainable regulation, U.S. fisheries have not proved immune to these trends.
By the National Marine Fisheries Service’s own yardstick, at the end of 2008,
26 percent of fish populations under its management were overfished.21 These
depleted populations include dinner-plate standbys, such as Atlantic Cod,
Atlantic Halibut, and Red Snapper, as well as newly popular species like
skates.22 Also, a recent study found that for every ten fish captured in U.S.
waters, three are thrown back; this discard rate is among the highest in world
fisheries.23 This unintentional capture and subsequent discard of often dead or

16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 1302.
See id. at 1304–06 tbls. 1, 2 (documenting the diversity of stressors).
See generally U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 43–44.
See Daniel Pauly, Reg Watson, & Jackie Alder, Global Trends in World Fisheries: Impacts on
Marine Ecosystems and Food Security, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 5 (2005); Peter Ward
& Ransom A. Myers, Shifts in Open-Ocean Fish Communities Coinciding with the Commencement of
Commercial Fishing, 86 ECOLOGY 835 (2005). But note that climate change is also likely to have a
major effect on fish populations and ocean ecosystems. See, e.g., Allison L. Perry et al., Climate Change
and Distribution Shifts in Marine Fishes, 308 SCIENCE 1912 (2005); GARY D. SHARP, FUTURE CLIMATE
CHANGE AND REGIONAL FISHERIES: A COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://
www.fao.org/docrep/006/y5028e/y5028e00.htm.
20. See Daniel Pauly et al., The Future for Fisheries, 302 SCIENCE 1359 (2003).
21. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, FISH STOCK SUSTAINABILITY INDEX: 2008 QUARTER 4 UPDATE THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
2008 (2008), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/statusoffisheries/SOSmain.htm (that translates
to 45 of the 173 federally managed fish stocks or stock complexes with known “overfished
determinations”). In 2007, the status of 338 other fish stocks or stock complexes in regard to their
overfished determinations was unknown. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2007 STATUS OF U.S. FISHERIES 4 (2008), available
at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/statusoffisheries/SOSmain.htm.
22. See FISH STOCK SUSTAINABILITY INDEX: 2008 QUARTER 4 UPDATE THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
2008, supra note 21, at 4.
23. See Jennie M. Harrington, Ransom A. Myers, & Andrew A. Rosenberg, Wasted Fishery
Resources: Discarded By-catch in the USA, 6 FISH & FISHERIES 350 (2005). The mortality rates for
animals discarded by fisheries can be highly variable and range from near zero to one hundred percent.
See generally Michael W. Davis, Key Principles for Understanding Fish Bycatch Discard Mortality, 59

1 - TURNIPSEED

2009]

4/23/2009 9:10:49 AM

BLUE WATER PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

7

injured animals in fisheries is considered to be a major conservation problem
because its impact on fish populations is often unaccounted for, and because it
often affects populations of threatened and endangered marine vertebrates.24
Marine biodiversity and abundance loss due to overexploitation has been
significant and is changing the structure and function of some ocean
ecosystems.25 To cite just one example, in U.S. and Canadian waters this trend
has resulted in the switch of the Atlantic Cod and (the now extinct) Sea Minkdominated Gulf of Maine ecosystem to a lobster and sea urchin-dominated
ecosystem.26
Sustainable oceans management in the United States will either continue
to be thwarted by a rigid, sectoral regulatory environment or made possible by
the evolution of progressive legal and management tools. Spearheaded by the
Pew Oceans Commission (2000–2003),27 the U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy (2000–2004),28 and the subsequent Joint Ocean Commission Initiative
(2005–present),29 the U.S. political arena has ripened to the prospect of an
oceans management overhaul in this decade.30 However, approaches thus far
have been narrowly regulatory, and have not yet implemented comprehensive
ocean governance reform. It is apparent that a unifying theme for oceans
management remains elusive. We propose that the public trust doctrine, a

CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 1834 (2002); F.S. Chopin & T. Arimoto, The Condition of
Fish Escaping from Fish Gears—A Review, 21 FISHERIES RES. 315 (1995).
24. See Harrington, Myers, & Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 350, 351.
25. See Daniel Pauly & Maria-Lourdes Palomares, Fishing Down Marine Food Webs: It Is Far
More Pervasive Than We Thought, 76 BULL. MARINE SCI. 197 (2005); Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing
Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCI. 860 (1998); but see J. F. Caddy et al., How Pervasive is “Fishing
Down Marine Food Webs”?, 282 SCIENCE 1383 (1998); Ray Hilborn, Faith-based Fisheries, 31
FISHERIES 554 (2006) (criticizing findings of widespread declines in fisheries and ocean ecosystems as
possibly inaccurate).
26. See Jeremy B. C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal
Ecosystems, 293 SCIENCE 629, 630 (2001); see also Kenneth T. Frank, Brian Petrie, Jae S. Choi, &
William C. Leggett, Trophic Cascades in A Formerly Cod-Dominated Ecosystem, 308 SCIENCE 1621
(2005) (on the eastern Scotian Shelf, the formerly Atlantic Cod-dominated ecosystem is now nearly
devoid of cod and dominated instead by Snow Crabs and shrimp).
27. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE
(2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_
ocean_life/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf.
28. The commission, appointed by President Bush under the Oceans Act of 2000, 33 U.S.C. §
857-19 (2006), to provide “balanced and practical proposals for the establishment of a comprehensive
and coordinated ocean policy,” released its report in September 2004. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY,
supra note 3, at vi.
29. See Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, http://www.jointoceancommission.org (last visited
November 23, 2008).
30. At the close of the 110th Congress, there were several bills regarding coasts and oceans under
consideration. See JOINT OCEAN COMM’N INITIATIVE, SUMMARY OF KEY OCEAN BILLS 1, 4–5, 7–10
(2008), available at http://www.joint.oceancommission.org/resource-center/6-Summary-of-SelectOcean-Bills/2008-04_Summary_of_Key_Ocean_Bills.pdf. Also, in January 2007, President Bush signed
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1891 (2006), which established strict guidelines for restoring U.S. fish populations.

1 - TURNIPSEED

8

4/23/2009 9:10:49 AM

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 36:1

sometimes ignored, sporadically controversial legal concept, can serve as the
foundation for this reform.
Adopted from English common law, the public trust doctrine, in its most
basic form, obliges states to hold certain lands and waters in trust for their
citizenry.31 The doctrine traditionally protects the public’s rights to fishing,
navigation, and commerce over and in these lands and waters. In the United
States, today, these include submerged lands under tidal waters, the beds of
navigable waterways, and the waters above both.32 More recently, the doctrine
has been applied to questions regarding everything from public beach access
and wetlands destruction to water rights in the West.33 As stated by the most
famous proponent of a wide application of the doctrine, Professor Joseph L.
Sax:
[T]he idea of a public trusteeship rests upon three related principles. First,
that certain interests—like the air and the sea—have such importance to the
citizenry as a whole that it would be unwise to make them the subject of
private ownership. Second, that they partake so much of the bounty of
nature, rather than of individual enterprise, that they should be made freely
available to the entire citizenry without regard to economic status. And,
finally, that it is a principal purpose of government to promote the interests
of the general public rather than to redistribute public goods from broad
public uses to restricted private benefit . . . .34
The public trust doctrine has proved to be valuable in guiding natural
resources decisions in various states, and has even made its way into many state
constitutions.35 However, despite the diversity of rights in state waters covered
by the public trust doctrine, its application to the U.S. territorial sea and EEZ
remains unresolved. Indeed, though the doctrine has more than two hundred
years of history in the United States, no court has ever explicitly established a
common law public trust doctrine either for federal lands or for the federal
ocean.36 Nor has Congress acted to create an explicit statutory federal trust
duty for federal terrestrial or submerged lands, even though public trust duties
and principles appear throughout federal environmental statutory language,
agency mission statements, and national policy recommendations.37 Reasons
for this situation likely trace to an enduring historic perception that the seas are
boundless and the development of comprehensive legal regimes are
31. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
32. State public trust waters generally extend to three nm seaward of the mean high tide line. See
infra note 114 and accompanying text. Public trust language has also been applied to federal lands
management, groundwater, and a number of other commonly held resources. See infra note 109.
33. See generally infra Part I.B.
34. JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 165
(1971).
35. See generally infra Part I.B.
36. See generally infra Part I.C and Part II.C. See also Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish
Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54–64
(2007).
37. See infra Part I.C and Part II.C.
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unnecessary,38 and to the relative newness of extensive U.S. sovereignty over
its adjacent continental shelf seabeds.39 Thus, the nature of the rights that the
federal government and citizenry enjoy over resources of the U.S. territorial sea
and EEZ, as well as the duty to manage and protect those resources, remains
ambiguous, and the question of a public trust doctrine that extends to the
nation’s federal ocean waters lingers.
Given the pressure to exploit EEZ resources, it would be valuable to
secure the place of the public trust doctrine in governing the relationship
between the federal government, federal ocean waters and the resources they
contain, and the people of the United States. Though we draw heavily on the
work of many commentators who have discussed the possibility of the public
trust doctrine extending to the two hundred mile borders of the EEZ,40 we
believe that this Article is the first to analyze comprehensively the possibility of
an enforceable public trust obligation for the federal government in the
management of ocean resources. We conclude that the modern regulatory
environment, ecological conditions, and governance problems justify the
expansion of the public trust doctrine to federal ocean waters.
This Article will outline the development of states’ public trust doctrines;
discuss the recent expansion of U.S. jurisdiction over its neighboring ocean
waters in the context of the global ocean enclosure movement of the twentieth
century; analyze possible avenues for expanding the public trust doctrine to
federal waters; and consider how a federal public trust doctrine could clarify
some specific, looming issues in U.S. oceans management. For illustrative
purposes, our focus is on fisheries. Fisheries are central to the national goal of
ecosystem-based oceans management, and repeated regulatory attempts have
failed to stem overfishing and habitat destruction in U.S. fisheries, indicating
that federal fisheries management, in particular, could benefit from the
application of public trust principles. At the heart of our analysis lie three
questions: (1) does a federal public trust doctrine exist; (2) if so, can we
rightfully extend it to include the entirety of the U.S. ocean waters; and (3)
could the doctrine provide the missing catalyst for federal agencies to manage
the use of U.S. ocean resources in a coordinated, sustainable fashion?

38. See infra notes 392–393 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Part II.A.
40. See, e.g., Casey Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 ORE.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1986); Jack H. Archer & M. Casey Jarman, Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities:
Applying Public Trust Principles to the Management of EEZ Space and Resources, 17 OCEAN &
COASTAL MGMT. 253 (1992); Sarah G. Newkirk, Property Rights in Fisheries, 78 BULL. MARINE SCI.
563 (2006); Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights
and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317 (2006); Babcock, supra note 36.
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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN U.S. OCEAN WATERS

A.

Tradition and Controversy

In its earliest incarnation in the United States, the public trust doctrine was
invoked to protect the public’s rights to fishing, navigation, and commerce in
navigable waters, including rivers, the Great Lakes, and coastal waters.41 This
idea is not unique to the U.S. legal system, or to its originator, English common
law; throughout history, disparate cultures and governments have
independently arrived at and protected the common right of the people to the
seashores and oceans. The Ch’in Dynasty in China (249–207 B.C.E.42)
protected public access to water, as did ancient Islamic law, eleventh century
regional French law, the Spanish thirteenth century code (Las Siete Partidas),
and various Native American cultures.43 Scholars generally trace the source of
the public trust doctrine in English common law to the Roman Institutes of
Justinian (533 C.E.),44 although it is likely that their expression of public trust
duties represented Justinian’s idealized commentary, not actual legal
doctrine.45 The concept first appeared in England during the Middle Ages in
the Magna Carta (1215) and the writings of Bracton.46 Subsequently, in 1667,
Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale, in De Jure Maris, established the duty of the
English Crown to hold all lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide in trust

41. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
42. Before Common Era. The Common Era (C.E.) began in the year 1 A.D.
43. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on
the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 428–30 (1989). See also Patrick
Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13
(1976).
44. See supra note 42 (defining C.E.). THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN II.I.1–2 (535 C.E.),
reprinted in 3 THE LIBRARY OF ORIGINAL SOURCES: THE ROMAN WORLD 100–166 (Oliver J. Thatcher
ed., 1907), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.html (“By the law of nature
these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the
sea. . . . [T]he right of fishing in a port, or in rivers, is common to all men.”); see also Deveney, supra
note 43, at 26, 28 (finding that the category of “things common to all” is also in the writings of the
“third-century jurist Marcian” and Genesis); Peter H. Sand, Public Trusteeship for the Oceans, in LAW
OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS
A. MENSAH 521 (R. Wolfrum & T.M. Ndiaye eds., 2007) (crediting Emperor Justinian’s notions of the
seashore commons to jurist Domitius Ulpianus (170–223 C.E.)).
45. See Deveney, supra note 43, at 17, 29 (“In reality, Roman law was innocent of the idea of
trusts, had no idea at all of a ‘public’ (in the sense we use the term) as the beneficiary of such a trust,
allowed no legal remedies whatever against state allotment of land, exploited by private monopolies
everything (including the sea and the seashore) that was worth exploiting, and had a general idea of
public rights that is quite alien to our own.” Further, “the sea and the seashore were ‘common to all’
only insofar as they were not yet appropriated to the use of anyone or allocated by the state.”) (citations
and emphasis omitted). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty
in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 634 (1986).
46. See Deveney, supra note 43, at 36–41 (Bracton included Roman law regarding the seas and
seashores in his BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (G. Woodbine & S. Thorne ed.,
Belknap Press 1968) (circa 1256)).
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for the English people and to protect them from private interests.47 English
common law was adopted by the original thirteen colonies, and, upon
Independence from England, public lands and waters along with concomitant
public trust duties became vested in the states.48
Much ink has been spilled recounting the controversial history and
development of the public trust doctrine in the United States.49 Several early
landmark cases played roles in shaping the doctrine, including Arnold v.
Mundy,50 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell,51 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois,52 and Shively v. Bowlby.53 Nineteenth-century courts were generally
47. See generally LORD HALE, DE JURE MARIS, in STUART A. MOORE, HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 384–406 (3d ed. 1888).
48. The manner in which the public trust doctrine came to be adopted and applied by U.S. courts
remains controversial. See Deveney, supra note 43; Lazarus, supra note 45; Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in
Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). Even the most famous proponent of the public trust
doctrine, Joseph Sax, notes that “only the most manipulative of historical readers could extract much
binding precedent from what happened a few centuries ago in England” and “neither Roman Law nor
the English experience with lands underlying tidal waters is the place to search for the core of the trust
idea.” Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 485 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention]; Joseph
L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185,
186 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Liberating from Historical Shackles].
49. For a more complete history, see Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48;
Wilkinson, supra note 43. For thorough discussions of the contentious history of the public trust
doctrine in the U.S., see Deveney, supra note 43; Lazarus, supra note 45; Kearney & Merrill, supra note
48. This Article will focus more on the application of the public trust doctrine to the oceans and less on
its applications to regulating decisions involving land, wildlife, tidelands, and private property.
50. 6 N.J.L. 1, 12–13, 77 (1821) (determining that upon Independence, the State of New Jersey
took over from the king trustee duties for the lands beneath navigable waters; finding that the state must
protect common use rights to oyster harvesting from lands submerged by navigable waters, as well as to
“navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance and all the other uses of the water and its products” and that no
grant by the state could divest citizens of these rights).
51. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (“For when the Revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the Constitution to the general government.”).
52. 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892) (When the Illinois Legislature granted the Chicago Harbor to the
Illinois Central Railroad Company (and then later repealed the grant and was subsequently sued), the
Supreme Court ruled to preserve the harbor for the people of Illinois. “That the State holds the title to
the lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan . . . by the common law, we have already shown
. . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters,
carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties. The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in
commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks and piers
therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as their
disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. . . . But that is a
very different doctrine from the one which would sanction the abdication of the general control of the
State over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such
abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the State to
preserve such waters for the use of the public.”); but see Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364,
399 (1926) (holding that states could convey tidelands to private interests free of any public trust duties
and that if a state wanted to ensure the rights of the public it would have to buy back the lands). Some
commentators suggest that Appleby substantially undercuts Illinois Central. See, e.g., James L.
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concerned with protecting common use rights to navigable waters, regulating
interstate commerce, and ensuring that new states held the same rights to their
shorelines, riverbanks, and submerged lands as the original thirteen states
(under the “equal footing doctrine”).54 The courts also imparted protection for
development: if states wished to transfer trust tidelands and submerged lands to
private ownership to encourage the development of ports and docks, they could
do so, provided that such grants were “subject to [the] trust and to the state’s
obligation to protect the public interest from any use that would substantially
impair the trust.”55
Though the core purpose of the public trust doctrine has endured two
centuries of American jurisprudence, it has steadily evolved to fit the perceived
needs of society.56 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, state and
federal judges “consistently defined [the] public interest to be largely
synonymous with . . . economic growth”57 and the public trust doctrine was “as
much a legal basis for economic expansion as for resource protection.”58
Consequently, by 1900, some states had broadened the reach of the doctrine to
cover city streets and subsurface infrastructure, directing that they be preserved
for common use.59 In the late 1960s, moreover, public sentiment shifted
towards valuing environmental, in addition to economic, sustainability, and the
scope of the doctrine expanded accordingly.60

Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 1, 63–68 (2007).
53. 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (“Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement
in the manner of lands above high water mark. They are of great value to the public for the purposes of
commerce, navigation and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or
subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them are vested in the
sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.”).
54. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845) (establishing that new states
must be entitled to the same sovereignty and jurisdiction over their territory as the original thirteen
states). See JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
AMERICA’S COASTS 3, 9 (1994). Protecting interstate commerce, which in the United States’ early years
heavily depended on rivers, the Great Lakes, and coastal waterways, was of critical interest to the
federal government. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824) (stating that “[t]he
power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of
America adopted their government”).
55. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 4.
56. See generally MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789–1920 (1987).
57. Id. at 411.
58. Lazarus, supra note 45, at 641. However, there were instances in which the public trust
doctrine was applied even when navigation or clear-cut economic motives were not concerned. For
example, in early New England, ordinances protected “great ponds”, which presumably did not carry
navigation interests. Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 484 n.44.
59. See SELVIN, supra note 56, at 417–18, 426–28.
60. See Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging
Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 396 (1991) (“Awareness of the
principles of ecology was among the major forces that shaped political decisions of the mid- to late
1960’s [sic].”) (footnote omitted).

1 - TURNIPSEED

2009]

4/23/2009 9:10:49 AM

BLUE WATER PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

13

Inspired by the use of the doctrine by states to protect their submerged
lands and resources, in 1970, Professor Sax suggested that the public trust
doctrine could be an effective tool with which the courts could address
widespread environmental degradation and pollution.61 His article, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
followed a decade that, along with social revolution, brought a reawakening of
environmental concern and values. Rachel Carson is often credited with
spawning this environmental movement through her book, Silent Spring
(1962), which exposed the effects of pesticides on bird populations. In the years
between Silent Spring and Professor Sax’s landmark invocation of the public
trust doctrine, the Wilderness Act62 and National Environmental Policy Act63
were enacted, and President Richard Nixon created the Environmental
Protection Agency.64 Despite these developments, public involvement in
protecting and managing natural resources was limited. In 1970, it remained
difficult for citizens to establish standing to bring suit against polluters.65
Professor Sax believed the public trust doctrine could provide the requisite
standing:
Of all the concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine
seems to have the breadth and substantive content which might make it
useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to develop a
comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.66
Professor Sax had very specific goals in introducing the public trust
doctrine to the debate on how best to protect natural resources. The public trust
doctrine, he argued, would enable the courts to fix problems with democracy
itself, which in his view was being corrupted by well-organized special
interests: “[p]ublic trust problems . . . occur in a wide range of situations in
61. See Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48.
62. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1131–1136 (2006)).
63. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (“[I]t is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and
other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”).
64. President’s Special Message to the Congress about Reorganization Plans to Establish the
Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1970
PUB. PAPERS 215 (July 9, 1970), available at http://www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/clientuploads/
directory/archive/1970_pdf_files/1970_0215.pdf.
65. Prior to the 1970s, a citizen could only bring suit if she could demonstrate injury to a narrowly
defined legal interest. See, e.g., Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 119, 137 (1939)
(finding that the legal right to bring suit particularly against a governmental agency had be “one of
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege”). But, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, several Supreme Court rulings
greatly liberalized standing requirements. See infra note 293; see also Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 662–69 (1973).
66. Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 474 (footnote omitted).
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which diffuse public interests need protection against tightly organized groups
with clear and immediate goals.”67 Professor Sax envisioned that the doctrine
was applicable to conflicts over air pollution, pesticides, strip mining, the
conversion of wetlands on private lands, and even to issues dealing with the
poor and with consumer groups.68 In 1980, he amended his goal for the public
trust doctrine, determining that the “central idea” was to protect “public
expectations against destabilizing changes, just as . . . private property” has
long been protected.69
The effect of the 1970 Sax article was “[t]antamount to an academic call
to legal arms on behalf of the natural environment,”70 and, as Professor Richard
J. Lazarus later declared, the public trust concept bore immediate “judicial
fruit.”71 According to Professor Lazarus, these cases generally fell into three
categories: “(1) private citizens suing the government for allegedly violating
the doctrine; (2) private citizens suing other private parties for allegedly
violating the doctrine; and (3) the government suing private parties for
allegedly violating the doctrine.”72
Professor Sax’s The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law
remains a controversial work of legal environmental advocacy. Criticisms often
focus on the question of whether the doctrine should be applied beyond its
traditional scope—protecting rights to navigation, fishing, and commerce in
navigable waterways. For example, according to Professor Lloyd R. Cohen, the
public trust doctrine’s journey over time “from the sea, up navigable streams, to
unnavigable streams, its leap to inland ponds, and then like our amphibian
ancestors its eventual emergence from the water and march across the land” is
“radical” and “illegitimate.”73 Other commentators, especially those concerned
67. Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 556; see also id. at 495–98, 557–61.
This idea was expressly critiqued by subsequent scholars. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy,
Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 404 (1997); Carol M. Rose,
Takings, Public Trust, Unhappy Truths, and Helpless Giants: A Review of Professor Joseph Sax's
Defense of the Environment Through Academic Scholarship: Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public
Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 356–360 (1998).
68. See Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 557 (“Only time will reveal the
appropriate limits of the public trust doctrine as a useful judicial instrument.”); see also SAX, supra note
34, at 172 (also advocating to expand the trust to cover congestion, noise, terrestrial natural areas, and
radioactivity).
69. Sax, Liberating from Historical Shackles, supra note 48, at 188.
70. Lazarus, supra note 45, at 632.
71. Id. (footnote omitted). By the time Professor Lazarus published his article in 1986, more than
one hundred judicial opinions in twenty-five states had invoked the doctrine. Id. at 644–45 (footnote
omitted).
72. Id. at 645–46 (footnotes omitted). In Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc.,
the court recently determined that citizens may only enforce the terms of the trust against the
governmental trustee and not the private party infringing on the trust. 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 602 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008). See also infra note 107.
73. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV.
239, 256 (1992). See also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 928 (stating that submerged lands under
navigable waters are “a uniquely vexed resource, in the sense of one afflicted by an extraordinarily high
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with protecting property rights, have challenged the historic origins of the
public trust doctrine in U.S. and English law,74 its ultimate utility as a basis for
environmental suits,75 and the potential for its use to be divisive and ultimately
harmful to environmental causes.76 At the same time, the doctrine has equally
robust defenders; and, as Professor David B. Hunter argued, “[a] more
desirable trend would be to switch the debate . . . from a discussion of the
doctrine’s historical roots to a discussion of the ecological values that should be
protected in the public interest.”77
This Article seeks only to explore the scope of the public trust doctrine as
it applies to federal ocean waters; thus, we forthrightly skirt many criticisms
concerning the legitimacy of the public trust doctrine’s “march across the
land.”78 Not only does our argument not breach the water’s edge, but it also
remains moored three to two hundred miles offshore, far from traditional
private property interests (i.e., the rights inherent in fee simple owners of
terrestrial lands). Be it by original intent or judicial interpretation, the public
trust doctrine has persevered in the United States. We seek to extend the
conversation seaward.
B.

Uses of the Doctrine by the States and Its “Unique Potential”

If it is once fully realized that the state is merely the custodian of the legal
title, charged with the specific duty of protecting the trust estate and
regulating its use, a clearer view can be had.79
The potential role for the public trust doctrine in the federal governance of
activities in the territorial sea and EEZ can be illustrated by examining how the
states have exercised their trust duties.80 The public trust doctrine has provided
a powerful authority to states to manage their trust lands for the benefit of the
degree of legal uncertainty,” and concluding that since “[i]t is not clear how many other resources are
vexed in a similar way,” the doctrine should not necessarily be extended to other resources).
74. According to Patrick Deveney and Glenn MacGrady, the U.S. public trust doctrine is based on
misinterpretations of English Common Law and, therefore, comprises several acts of legal fiction. See
Deveney, supra note 43; Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law:
Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 511, 514–15 (1975). This argument has been cited extensively by others. See, e.g., Huffman,
supra note 52, at 8–13.
75. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 45, at 692–98.
76. See, e.g., id.; see also infra notes 295–299 and accompanying text.
77. David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial Protection of the
Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 378 (1988).
78. Cohen, supra note 73, at 256.
79. State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916).
80. Questions of coastal development and takings, as well as beach access, have featured most
prominently in state jurisprudence and legislation that have invoked the public trust doctrine. However,
these issues are largely without blue-water analogs and therefore will only be mentioned here. For
takings cases, see infra note 84. For cases concerning public access to beaches, see, e.g., Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Concerned Citizens of
Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass’n v. North Carolina ex rel. Rhodes, 404 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1991);
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
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public interest.81 According to commentator Jack H. Archer and his co-authors
in their guide to using the public trust doctrine in coastal management, the
unique potential of the doctrine lies in (1) its historical origin and use, which,
unlike police power, is directly tied to the specific nature of coastal access;82
(2) its very nature as a trust;83 and (3) its capacity as a common law to adapt to
the changing needs of society.84 To understand the general utility of the public
trust doctrine to states and its potential for expansion to federal ocean waters, it
is constructive to look more closely at these attributes.
By providing authority to states that is supplemental to their police powers
and their ability to enjoin public nuisance and eminent domain laws, the public
trust doctrine provides states an additional tool with which to pursue
progressive coastal management programs.85 Though it is essential to the
exercise of state regulatory authority, police power has proven limited in
questions of coastal management.86 The police power is too broad to provide a
workable framework within which to address coastal problems, especially those
regarding conflicting uses of coastal lands and resources.87 It also is rooted in
restricting harmful activities and cannot easily contribute to the development of
affirmative management programs.88
The other powerful aspect of the public trust doctrine is that “at its root
[is] the notion of a legally enforceable ‘trust.’”89 As a result, the nature of the
public trust and the duties it imposes on state trustees can be elucidated by
comparison to the well-developed body of law regarding private and charitable
trusts.90 This is especially important since only a few courts have explicitly
81. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 4.
82. Id.; see also id. at 3 (“The police power consists of those prerogatives of sovereignty and
legislative power which are necessary for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of state
citizens and which the states did not surrender to the federal government when the United States
Constitution was adopted.”).
83. Id. at 4–5.
84. Id. at 4. Archer et al. included the ability of the public trust doctrine to fortify states against
takings claims as also contributing to its unique potential. This attribute of the doctrine is important, but
we have reserved most discussion of it to Part III.C. In coastal takings cases, courts have employed the
public trust doctrine as a “background principle” in their rejections of takings claims. See, e.g.,
Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003).
85. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 3; see also Jan Stevens, Foreword to ARCHER ET AL.,
supra note 54, at vii (The public trust doctrine provides courts a “basis, independent of police power, for
the limitation of uses to which [coastal] property may be subjected.”).
86. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
87. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 3.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 4–5.
90. Id. at 5, 30–44. However, the analogy to private and charitable trust law is not perfect: a major
difficulty lies in identifying the trustee. The public trust doctrine vests trustee responsibilities in the
sovereign, which is the people in the American system. The representative government is the
embodiment of the people; therefore, state legislatures prove technically to be both the sovereign and the
public, the trustee and the beneficiaries. Yet Jack Archer and co-authors conclude that in the end there is
no “conceptual difficulty” because “another perfectly acceptable analogy is that the sovereign people
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defined what it means for states to hold lands in trust for their citizens.91 Thus,
“[t]his analogous law,” according to Jack Archer and co-authors, “is a valuable
source of insight and precedent . . . .”92
Generally, “[a] trust may be defined as a fiduciary relationship in which
one person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to keep
or use that interest for the benefit of another.”93 According to the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts,
[i]n the strict, traditional sense, a trust involves three elements:
(1) a trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to duties to deal
with it for the benefit of one or more others;
(2) one or more beneficiaries, to whom and for whose benefit the trustee
owes the duties with respect to the trust property; and
(3) trust property, which is held by the trustee for the beneficiaries.94
Drawing insight from traditional trust law is particularly instructive
because it details the responsibilities and obligations of the trustees.95 For
instance, the duty of loyalty mandates “the trustee [must] administer the trust
solely in the interests of the beneficiaries and not act in its personal interest if
such conduct might conflict with the interests of the beneficiaries.”96 In
addition, trustees bear certain obligations to manage the corpus of the trust in
the best interest of the beneficiaries; indeed, in multi-generational trust
instruments this duty mandates that the needs of current beneficiaries must be

have created the public trust for themselves as beneficiaries and their agent, the legislature [or its
delegate, a coastal management agency, for example], as the trustee.” Id. at 31 n.64 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 114, 115(4), 127 (1959)). Charitable trusts are a superior
analogy to public trusts than private trusts, because, like public trusts, they too benefit numerous and
generally unidentified communities or citizenries and may be of indefinite durations. Private trust
instruments, on the other hand, generally specify the beneficiaries and are of limited duration. Id. at 35,
41.
91. But see Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989)
(finding that “[a] public trustee is endowed with the same duties and obligations as an ordinary trustee);
see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (The California Supreme
Court addressed the “authority and obligations of the state as administrator of the public trust” and
concluded that “the dominant theme is the state’s sovereign power and duty to exercise continued
supervision over the trust.”).
92. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 5.
93. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 1 (rev. 2d ed. 1984) (emphasis and footnote omitted). Furthermore, “a fiduciary relation is
one in which the law demands of one party an unusually high standard of ethical and moral conduct with
reference to another." Id. (footnote omitted).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. f (2003).
95. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 34–41. See also generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS (2007) (documenting the general duties and powers of trustees).
96. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 35. Other duties include the duty to not delegate, the duty to
provide information, the duty to control trust property, and the duty to make trust property productive.
Id. In addition, if the trustee uses trust property for its own benefit, it must fairly recompense the trust.
Id.
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balanced with those of future beneficiaries.97 This idea is called
“intergenerational equity,” and, in short, it means that the trustee must ensure
that the corpus of the trust is managed in a sustainable manner, such that the
needs of current beneficiaries are met without sacrificing the ability of future
beneficiaries to meet their needs.98
The duty to “deal impartially” with current and future beneficiaries
provides guidance and justification to state agencies and courts seeking to
resolve pressures to maximize current trust uses with countervailing needs to
conserve future uses.99 An example of this conflict lies in fisheries
management. At first, catch limits, closed fishing seasons, and marine protected
areas may seem to conflict with “undoubtedly the single most important public
trust guarantee”100—access to submerged lands, tidal waters, and the resources
within them. However, an equally important and essential use of public trust
resources is preservation for future generations,101 and states can lawfully
assert authority under the public trust doctrine to “regulate present-day
exploitation to ensure the reasonable preservation of resources for future
use.”102
In addition to the duty to deal impartially, trustees are also bound by a
duty to preserve the trust property, which includes the obligation not only to
maintain or repair the trust corpus but also to improve it.103 In some states,
courts have held that this duty obligates the state trustee or delegate agency to
protect the trust from pollution or degradation by taking affirmative action
against parties infringing on it.104 Courts have recognized this duty: e.g., “[t]he
State has not only has the right but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to
97. This is one of the most difficult aspects of managing a trust. Id. at 38–39 (“The current
beneficiary has an interest in having the trustee [manage] the trust property to yield the highest current
income. In contrast, the future beneficiary wants the trustee to exercise the utmost caution to preserve or
expand [the trust].”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. c (2007) (discussing the
trustee’s duty to balance competing interests of current and future beneficiaries).
98. This language closely mirrors a commonly used definition of sustainable development:
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.” WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
99. ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 38–40.
100. Lazarus, supra note 45, at 711 (footnote omitted).
101. See, e.g., W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)
(concluding that the government was justified in enacting a law to protect groundwater because it was
“merely discharging [its] obligation under the societal contract between ‘Those who are dead, those who
are living and those who are yet to be born’” (citing EDMUND BURKE, SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 318 (1949))).
102. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 39–40.
103. Id. at 38–40.
104. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927) (“The trust reposed in
the state is not a passive trust: it is governmental, active, and administrative . . . . [T]he trust, being both
active and administrative, requires the law-making body to act in all cases where action is necessary, not
only to preserve the trust, but to promote it.”); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,
728 (Cal. 1983) (“The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning
and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”) (footnote
omitted).
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ensure that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment are
protected, and to seek compensation for any diminution in that trust corpus.”105
Furthermore, if a state trustee does not uphold the trust, the attorney general106
or private parties107 may have standing to seek judicial redress from the state.
A third characteristic of the public trust doctrine that imbues it with unique
potential lies in its ability as a common law to evolve to meet the changing
needs of society. Though it is difficult to generalize, a few landmark cases and
state legislative acts elucidate how state public trust doctrines have evolved to
cover uses of natural resources beyond the traditional triad of fishing,
commerce, and navigation.108 Key to the history of states’ public trust doctrines
is the theme of expansion, both in geographic scope and substance.
For instance, many states have broadened the scope of their public trust
doctrines to protect a variety of resources and lands deemed “public.”109
105. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 674 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1973), aff’d, 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351
A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976). See also, e.g., Md. Dep’t. of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060,
1067 (D. Md. 1972) (Ruling that “if the State is deemed to be the trustee of the waters, then, as trustee,
the State must be empowered to bring suit to protect the corpus of the trust -- i.e., the waters -- for the
beneficiaries of the trust -- i.e., the public.”).
106. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (“‘One helpful indication in
determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State
standing to sue parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt
to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.’”) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va.
1980) (“[U]nder the doctrine of parens patria, the state acts to protect a quasi-sovereign interest where
no individual cause of action would lie.”) (citation omitted); see also Ryke Longest, Massachusetts
versus EPA: Parens Patriae Vindicated, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 277 (2008); Allan Kanner, The
Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural
Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57 (2005).
107. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 600 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008) (noting that “‘[a]ny member of the general public . . . has standing to raise a claim of
harm to the public trust.’”) (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 716 n.11 (Cal.
1983)). Under this ruling, a private party can only sue the state trustee, not the party infringing on the
trust. See id. at 602 (“Under traditional trust concepts, plaintiffs, viewed as beneficiaries of the public
trust, are not entitled to bring an action against those whom they allege are harming trust property. . . .
‘[W]here a trustee cannot or will not enforce a valid cause of action that the trustee ought to bring
against a third person, a trust beneficiary may seek judicial compulsion against the trustee.’”) (citing
Saks v. Damon Raike & Co., 7 Cal. App. 4th 419, 427 (1992)).
108. See infra notes 111–129 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (ruling that
the public must be allowed to access to the dry sand beach to enjoy its rights to the tidal lands); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Wis. 1972) (extending the doctrine to inland wetlands);
Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (affirming that
New York City’s parks are “impressed with a public trust for the benefit of the people”); Mayor of
Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (applying
the public trust doctrine to drinking water); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445–447
(Haw. 2000) (holding that the public trust doctrine applies to all water in the state of Hawaii), aff’d in
part and vacated on unrelated grounds in part by In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 105 Haw. 1
(2004); In re Wai’ola O Moloka’i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 692 (Haw. 2004); Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d
1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applying the doctrine to archeological remains); Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984) (using the doctrine to protect stream
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Initially, courts understood the reach of the public trust doctrine to encompass
the submerged lands under navigable, tidal waters and the waters
themselves.110 The courts later expanded the definition of “navigable waters”
to include inland rivers and lakes not influenced by the tides.111 In 1988, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi that
non-navigable tidal lands were also vested in the states and that Mississippi’s
expansive definition of public tidelands was warranted due to the shared
“‘geographical, chemical, and environmental qualities’ that make [all] lands
beneath tidal waters unique.”112 The Court also affirmed that each state may
determine the geographic limits of the land it holds in public trust.113 State
public trust lands now generally comprise (1) submerged lands under navigable
waters, (2) lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and (3) lands seaward
of the mean high tide line out to 3 nm.114 If these lands are conveyed to private
parties, the lands carry with them a public trust burden.115

access, including the right to portage over adjacent private land); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (applying the doctrine to protect areas surrounding redwood
forests); see also Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121, 122 (1981) (arguing that
the doctrine should be extended to cover artworks). But see Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A
Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 519 n.19 (1989) (“Exciting as
extension of the public trust doctrine to these new frontiers may be to many, it would be well to
acknowledge that the doctrine currently draws a great deal of strength and legitimacy directly from its
long historical link with navigable water. Much remains to be done to make the public trust doctrine a
truly effective tool to preserve public values in navigable water and associated natural resources;
consequently it might be best at this time not to seek to extend the public trust doctrine to entirely new
arenas.”).
110. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821).
111. See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454–457 (1851); Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877); Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 374 (1977).
112. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 481 (1988) (quoting Kaiser Etna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 183 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
113. Id. at 475 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)).
114. Since 1953, when the Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act, “navigable waters” of
coastal states have included the waters out to three nautical miles from their coastlines. State waters off
Texas and the western coast of Florida extend to nine nm offshore due to these areas’ origins under
Spanish law. The act granted ownership of these submerged seabeds to the states by extending the
definition of “navigable waters.” Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006). See also
Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. 469; Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
115. The Mono Lake court concluded that public trust responsibilities inhered in the title to the
affected properties: “[P]arties acquiring rights in trust property generally hold those rights subject to the
trust, and can assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust.” Nat’l Audubon
Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983); see also City of Lost Angeles v. Venice
Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1982); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 606
P.2d 362 (Cal. 1980) (both cases determined that tidelands, whether publicly or privately owned, carry
public trust burdens); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 (Cal. 1971) (“‘The only practicable theory is
to hold that all tide land is included, but that the public right was not intended to be divested or affected
by a sale of tide lands under these general laws relating alike both to swamp land and tide lands. Our
opinion is that . . . the buyer of land under these statutes receives the title to the soil, the jus privatum,
subject to the public right of navigation, and in subordination to the right of the state to take possession
and use and improve it for that purpose, as it may deem necessary. In this way the public right will be
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The California Supreme Court pioneered the expansion of public trust
responsibilities to include conservation. In 1970, the court prohibited a private
owner from filling in and developing tidelands on his property because his title
carried public trust burdens, which included the obligation of preservation:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public
uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.116
In 1983, in the famed Mono Lake case, the California Supreme Court
again upheld conservation as a legal public trust use:
[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public
property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to
protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.117
The right to recreation is also now part of many coastal states’ public trust
easements:
Public trust easements . . . . have been held to include the right to fish, hunt,
bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the
navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters
for anchoring, standing, or other purposes. The public has the same rights
in and to tidelands.118
States have also applied the public trust doctrine to the management and
conservation of wildlife, both aquatic119 and terrestrial.120 For instance, in
Smith v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court established:
preserved and the private right of the purchaser will be given as full effect as the public interests will
permit.’”) (citing People v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 87 (Cal. 1913)).
116. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380. See also Rieser, supra note 60, at 407 (noting that Marks v. Whitney
did not cite a specific authority for the extension of the doctrine to ecological preservation).
117. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 724.
118. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (citations omitted); see also Forestier v. Johnson, 127 P. 156 (Cal.
1912); Bohn v. Albertson, 238 P.2d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Proctor v. Wells, 103 Mass. 216 (1869);
Nelson v. DeLong, 7 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 1942); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-theSea, 294 A.2d 47, 45–55 (N.J. 1972); Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941); Hillebrand v. Knapp,
274 N.W. 821 (S.D. 1937); Munninghoff v. Wis. Conservation Comm’n, 38 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1949).
See also Mineral County v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) (concurring opinion) (observing that the
public trust doctrine has evolved in that state; “[a]lthough the original objectives of the public trust were
to protect the public’s rights in navigation, commerce, and fishing, the trust has evolved to encompass
additional public values—including recreational and ecological uses”).
119. See, e.g., People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897) (treating fish as public trust
resources, regardless of whether they were found in navigable waters); see also infra note 121 and
accompanying text, and note 126.
120. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 591 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that California’s public trust includes wild birds, in addition to fish and
submerged lands). For a more complete account of the early extension of public trust duties to wildlife,
see Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of
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Whatever soil below low-water mark is the subject of exclusive propriety
and ownership, belongs to the State on whose maritime border, and within
whose territory it lies . . . . [T]his soil is held by the State, not only subject
to, but in some sense in trust for, the enjoyment of certain public rights,
among which is the common liberty of taking fish, as well shellfish as
floating fish. The State holds the propriety of this soil for the conservation
of the public rights of fishery thereon, and may regulate the modes of that
enjoyment so as to prevent the destruction of the fishery . . . . This power
results from the ownership of the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of
the State over it, and from its duty to preserve unimpaired those public uses
for which the soil is held.121
Subsequently in 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Geer v. Connecticut,
confirmed that “the power or control pledged in the State, resulting from
[common ownership of wildlife], is to be exercised, like all other powers of
government, as a trust for the benefit of the people.”122 In outlining the trust
responsibilities of states over wildlife, the Court used ownership language123
with which later Supreme Court Justices quarreled124 and ultimately overturned
in the Court’s 1976 decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma.125 Nevertheless, the trust
Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 655, 693–96 (2005). See also infra notes 122–
127, 218–222.
121. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 74–75 (1855) (citations excluded) (emphasis added). See also Dunham
v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 268, 273–74 (1855) (arguing that by virtue of its authority to regulate
“the use and enjoyment of public and common rights,” a state could create and enforce laws to regulate
fishing).
122. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896); see also id. at 527–28 (finding a state’s public
trust includes wildlife and that the ability of state governments “to control the taking of animals ferae
naturae, which was thus recognized and enforced by the common law of England, was vested in the
colonial governments [upon Independence]”).
123. See, e.g., id. at 534 (“the authority of the State [is] derived from the common ownership of
game and the trust for the benefit of its people which the State exercises in relation thereto”); Lacoste v.
Dep’t of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1924) (“The wild animals within its borders are, so far as
capable of ownership, owned by the State in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all its
people.”).
124. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979) (“The erosion of Geer began only 15
years after it was decided.”); see also id. at 334–35 (“‘Neither the States nor the Federal Government,
any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to [wild fish, birds, or animals] until they are
reduced to possession by skillful capture . . . .’”) (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.
265, 284 (1977) (citing Geer, 161 U.S. at 539–40 (Field, J., dissenting))).
125. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335 (overturning Geer and ruling that “[t]he ‘ownership’ . . . must be
understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing ‘the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource’”) (quoting Douglas,
431 U.S. at 284 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948))). Justice Rehnquist and Chief
Justice Burger dissented on the grounds that the Geer v. Connecticut did not actually concern interstate
commerce, and argued that the Geer Court did not actually use the term "ownership" in a proprietary
sense. Citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), they stated: “The Court in Geer expressed
the view derived from Roman law that the wild fish and game located within the territorial limits of a
State are the common property of its citizens and that the State, as a kind of trustee, may exercise this
common ‘ownership’ for the benefit of its citizens. Admittedly, a State does not ‘own’ the wild creatures
within its borders in any conventional sense of the word. But the concept expressed by the ‘ownership’
doctrine is not obsolete. This Court long has recognized that the ownership language of Geer and similar
cases is simply a shorthand way of describing a State's substantial interest in preserving and regulating
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responsibilities of states over wildlife as mandated by Geer remain in place
after Hughes.126 For instance, a 2008 decision by the California Court of
Appeals, citing Professor Gary Meyers, recently concluded:
[W]hile the fiction of state ownership of wildlife is consigned to history,
the state’s responsibility to preserve the public’s interest through
preservation and wise use of natural resources is a current imperative. In
essence, the public trust doctrine commands that the state not abdicate its
duty to preserve and protect the public’s interest in common natural
resources. Thus, whatever its historical derivation, it is clear that the public
trust doctrine encompasses the protection of undomesticated birds and
wildlife.127
In addition to the crucial role the judiciary has served in protecting state
waters and wildlife with the public trust doctrine, many state legislatures have
incorporated public trust principles into their environmental management
statutory authorities,128 and many—including Alaska, Florida, Hawaii,
Louisiana, and Pennsylvania—have gone so far as to codify public trust
principles in their constitutions.129 The use of public trust principles in different
the exploitation of the fish and game and other natural resources within its boundaries for the benefit of
its citizens.” Id. at 341–42 (citations and footnote omitted).
126. See, e.g., Clajon Produce Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 850–51 (D. Wyo. 1994) (finding
that the Hughes ruling did not change states’ responsibilities to wildlife) (citing Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1426–27); Kanner, supra note 106, at 73–74 (“Hughes preserved the
trust responsibility set forth in Geer.”). See also Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P. 2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996)
(concluding that “the public trust responsibilities imposed on the state by the [Alaska state constitution]
compel the conclusion that fish occurring in their natural state are property of the state for purposes of
carrying out its trust responsibilities.”); Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988) (holding
that the public trust doctrine “impose[s] upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water
resources of the state for the benefit of all the people”) (footnote omitted).
127. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 599 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (citing Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 734–35 (1989)).
128. See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 88–90 (citing several state statutes); North Carolina
Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-102(b)(4)(f) (2008) (One of the goals
is “[t]he protection of present common-law and statutory public rights in the lands and waters of the
coastal area.”); 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.01(2)(a) (2008) (The Department of Environmental Protection
must protect the “tidelands, Great Ponds, and on-tidal rivers and streams in accordance with the public
trust doctrine, as established by common law and codified in the colonial Ordinances of 1641–47 and
subsequent statutes and case law of Massachusetts.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:640.3(A) (2004) (The
state must hold its fisheries “in trust for the benefit of all its citizens.”); see also New Jersey Water
Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-2 (West 2008) (“It is the policy of this State to restore,
enhance and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of its waters, to protect public
health, to safeguard fish and aquatic life and scenic and ecological values, and to enhance the domestic,
municipal, recreational, industrial and other uses of water.”).
129. At least forty-two state constitutions now either expressly mention public trust principles or
contain some mention of environmental protection or natural resources. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art.
VIII, § 3 (The Alaska Constitution implies a public trust relationship among the state, the people, and
fish: “[w]herever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for
common use.”); FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 11 (“The title to lands under navigable waters, within the
boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines,
is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may be
authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of portions of such land may be
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areas of government is mutually reinforcing: “by integrating constitutional,
statutory and regulatory standards into the public trust law of any particular
state, the doctrine can work side by side with the statutory and regulatory
framework to provide incentives to protect natural resources and the
environment.”130 In her analysis of the interplay among case, statutory, and
constitutional law uses of the public trust doctrine, Professor Alexandra Klass
concluded that until the day comes when states’ environmental regulations are
truly robust, “public trust principles allow the courts to participate
appropriately in the law of natural resources protection.”131
In summary, it is widely recognized today that there is not one single,
uniform public trust doctrine in the United States; instead, each state can, and
does, define the scope and fabric of the doctrine to fit its needs.132 However,
commonalities among states’ public trust doctrines are evident. As summarized
by commentator Stephen E. Roady, each state generally:
[(1)] [h]as public trust interests, rights and responsibilities in its navigable
waters [and nonnavigable tidelands], the lands beneath these waters, and
the living resources therein;

authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest.”); HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 6
(“For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve
and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and
energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation . . . . All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people,” including “the archipelagic waters of the state.”); PA. CONST. art. I § 27
(“Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.”); see also Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P. 2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (ruling
that Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution imposes public trust duties on the state); CWC Fisheries,
Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Alaska 1988) (invoking Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution in
determining that the public trust burden is preserved in tidal lands unless the statute explicitly states
otherwise); see generally Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 714 (2006) (“While some state constitutional
provisions do no more than authorize the legislature to enact environmental laws (which it already has
authority to do under its inherent police power), others codify the common law public trust doctrine or
set out a constitutional policy to protect the environment. Yet others grant rights to all citizens for a
‘clean and healthful environment’ or place mandatory duties on the state to protect the environment.”)
(footnote omitted); Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1169 (1997); ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 86–88.
130. Klass, supra note 129, at 745. “[T]o the extent the common law public trust doctrine can
provide support to or be supported by environmental policies in state statutes or constitutions, the
doctrine will be in a position to play a more important role in state environmental protection efforts.” Id.
at 713–14. For example, the Montana Supreme Court has held that “under the public trust doctrine and
the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used
by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes.” See
In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 397 (Mont. 2002).
131. Klass, supra note 129, at 748.
132. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (“[I]t has long been
established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public
trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 26 (1894)).
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[(2)] [h]as the authority to define the boundary limits of the lands and
waters held in public trust;
[(3)] [h]as the authority to recognize and convey private proprietary rights
(the jus privatum) in its trust lands, and thus diminish the public’s rights
therein, with the corollary responsibility not to substantially impair the
public’s use and enjoyment of the remaining trust lands, waters and living
resources;
[(4)] [h]as a trustee’s duty and responsibility to preserve and continuously
assure the public’s ability to fully use and enjoy public trust lands and
waters for certain trust uses; and
[(5)] [d]oes not have the power to abdicate its role of trustee of the public’s
jus publicum rights, although in certain limited cases the State can
terminate the jus publicum in small parcels of trust land.133
Though the public trust doctrine has not been without its detractors, it is
now firmly established throughout states’ environmental protection regimes.
The role of the doctrine at the federal level, however, remains opaque. We now
turn to waters further offshore and the potential for a federal public trust
doctrine to inform the management of such waters.

C.

A Public Trust Doctrine for Federal Waters

In 1983, by presidential proclamation, President Ronald Reagan created
the U.S. EEZ, which today includes the band of seabed and waters from 12 to
200 nm off the coasts of the United States and its territorial holdings.134
Whether an expansion of the public trust doctrine accompanied this extension
of U.S. sovereignty and jurisdiction over its adjacent seas has never been
expressly tested in the courts or established in law.
However, the unresolved possibility of a public trust doctrine for federal
ocean waters has not prevented national studies, the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy, and federal agencies from using public trust language to describe
the federal government’s duty to its citizens to steward resources in the EEZ.
For example:

133. Stephen E. Roady, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 41–
42 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg, & Michael Sutton eds. 2008) (summarizing COASTAL STATE
ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK, 17–18 (2d ed. 1997) and clarifying that in
English common law, “public trust land is vested with two titles: the jus publicum, the public’s right to
use and enjoy trust lands and waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related public
purposes, and the jus privatum, or the private proprietary rights in the use and possession of trust
lands”).
134. In 1983 the territorial sea only extended to three nm from the shores of the United States, so
President Reagan’s initial proclamation established a 197-nm wide EEZ. But in 1988, he declared the
extension of the territorial sea to twelve nm from shore. See Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22, 23
(1983) and Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989).
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Fisheries within federal waters are held in public trust for the people of the
United States.—National Research Council135
This Commission has a vision of how the health of our oceans and coasts
can be restored and protected. It is a vision based on the principle that we
must treat our oceans as a public trust to be managed for the common
good.—Pew Oceans Commission136
The U.S. government holds ocean and coastal resources in the public trust–
a special responsibility that necessitates balancing different uses of those
resources for the continued benefit of all Americans.—U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy137
As a steward, NOAA Fisheries has an obligation to conserve, protect, and
manage living marine resources in a way that ensures their continuation as
functioning components of marine ecosystems, affords economic
opportunities, and enhances the quality of life for the American public.—
NOAA Fisheries “Vision” Statement138
Despite such widespread public trust language, the question as to whether
a definite federal public trust responsibility for federal ocean waters exists
remains unresolved. Thus, it is an open question whether the U.S. citizenry can,
at present, demand the same rights to sustainable use and management of
resources in federal ocean waters that state citizenries can expect with respect
to resources in state public trust waters.
Under these circumstances, there is ample reason to explore the explicit
extension of the public trust doctrine to federal ocean waters. The doctrine
imposes affirmative duties on state governments to manage uses of the public
trust for the benefit of their citizens, and state judiciaries are able to rely on the
doctrine (expressed in common law, statutory authority and/or state
constitutional provisions) to redress actions that impair the public trust.
Likewise, a federal public trust doctrine that reached to the outer edges of the
EEZ would impart an affirmative duty on federal oceans agencies to balance
the needs of current and future citizens, and a means by which American
citizenry could assert their interests in the preservation of the trust corpus.

135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON
INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 45 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=6335.
136. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, supra note 27, at 99. See also id. at x (“To achieve and maintain
healthy ecosystems requires that we change our perspective and extend an ethic of stewardship and
responsibility toward the oceans. Most importantly, we must treat our oceans as a public trust. The
oceans are a vast public domain that is vitally important to our environmental and economic security as
a nation. The public has entrusted the government with the stewardship of our oceans, and the
government should exercise its authority with a broad sense of responsibility toward all citizens and
their long-term interests.”).
137. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 6, 61, 472.
138. NOAA Fisheries: About National Marine Fisheries Service, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/what/
mission.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). NOAA Fisheries is often referred to as the National Marine
Fisheries Service.
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Under a federal public trust doctrine, federal ocean managers would become
more than policymakers. They would become guardians of the public trust.
The territorial sea and the EEZ are rather complex constructions of
governance, however. Before we explore potential avenues for enclosing them
within a federal public trust doctrine, it is necessary to examine the history of
the twentieth century ocean enclosure movement, sovereignty and the influence
of international treaties and customary law,139 and federal common law.
II.

A.

INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

The Twentieth Century Ocean Enclosure Movement

During the twentieth century, in concert with the rest of the world’s
coastal nations, the United States asserted increasing authority over the ocean
waters and seabed adjacent to its shores.140 Prior to this time, the U.S.’s
territorial sea reached out only to 3 nm from its shores.141 The next one
hundred years saw significant changes in international ocean law, as coastal
nations and their citizens increasingly sought to secure rights over the oil and
gas, mineral, and fisheries resources within their adjacent seas. While a full
history of the twentieth century ocean enclosure movement is beyond the scope
of this Article, we note highlights as they apply to the current state of U.S.
ocean governance.142
During the first century of the American republic, marine oil reserves had
yet to be discovered off the U.S. coasts, and questions regarding rights to the
resources of the seas were generally limited to oyster beds and the rights to
access and profit from them.143 The discovery of oil in the Gulf of Mexico in
the early twentieth century initiated the development of a legal framework to
facilitate its exploitation.144 In 1945, President Truman issued two presidential
proclamations about what were then considered the “high seas”—the waters
seaward of the United States’ 3-nm territorial sea. One proclamation declared
exclusive jurisdiction and control over the oil, gas, and mineral resources of the
continental shelf adjacent to the United States, and the other created federal
139. Customary international law “consists of norms that emerge from the actual practices of states
undertaken with an understanding that the practice is required by law.” Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of
Customary International Law in Federal and State Court Litigation, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 361, 368
(2004).
140. See Lewis M. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 561, 561 (1983).
141. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33 n.16, 42 (1947) (documenting the original
claim of a three-mile territorial sea by Thomas Jefferson in 1793).
142. For a more complete history of the twentieth century ocean enclosure movement, see generally
LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN
GOVERNANCE (1996); PHILIP E. STEINBERG, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE OCEAN (2001).
143. See generally BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WATERS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW
AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY (1998).
144. See Osherenko, supra note 40, at 346–47.
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authority to regulate fisheries in the waters above the shelf.145 Truman’s
unilateral and unprecedented assertions of control over the continental shelf
were “almost certainly illegal at the time.”146 Nonetheless, they jump-started
the modern global ocean enclosure movement, and a frantic assertion of
authority by coastal nations followed.147
International law quickly evolved to accommodate the expansive claims of
the United States and other nations to their adjoining seas and seabeds. In 1958,
in an attempt to stem some of the more aggressive claims to the high seas, the
United Nations (U.N.) convened the First Conference on the Law of the Sea.148
The resulting treaties codified the sovereignty of coastal states over their
internal waters and territorial seas; allowed for the creation of “contiguous
zones” beyond nations’ territorial seas; and, recognized the legal, sovereign
rights of nations to the resources of their continental shelves and to regulate
fisheries occurring in the high seas adjacent to their territorial seas.149
In 1960, the U.N. held the Second Conference on the Law of the Sea to
resolve whether the maximum allowable breadth of states’ territorial seas
should be three nm or twelve nm.150 At the time, some nations claimed twelvemile territorial seas, and others went so far as to claim two hundred-mile
exclusive fishing zones.151 The delegates did not reach agreement, however,
and the convention failed.152 The United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) were concerned that the “creeping jurisdiction”
of coastal nations into the high seas would impair their navies’ navigational
145. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303, 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945) (“[T]he Government of
the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath
the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States,
subject to its jurisdiction and control.”); Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (Oct. 2, 1945).
This proclamation did not change the “high seas character” of the waters above the continental shelf:
“The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and
unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected.” Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. at 12,303.
146. See JOSEPH J. KALO, RICHARD G. HILDRETH, ALISON RIESER, & DONNA R. CHRISTIE,
COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 376 (3d ed. 2007).
147. See Alexander, supra note 140, at 566. By 1958, thirty-seven countries claimed 3-mile-,
thirteen countries claimed 12-mile-, and three countries claimed 200-mile-territorial seas.
148. Id.
149. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.S
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559
U.N.T.S. 285.
150. See ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 40 (1981); Alexander,
supra note 140, at 567.
151. In 1945, 27 of 44 reporting nations (61 percent) claimed 3-mile territorial seas, 15 claimed
between 4 and 12 miles, and 2 claimed 12 miles. By 1972, 25 out of 111 reporting nations (22 percent)
claimed 3-mile territorial seas, 15 claimed between 3 and 12 miles, 56 claimed 12 miles, and 15 claimed
more than 12 miles. Three nations (Chile, Nicaragua, and Peru) of this last set claimed 200-mile
exclusive fishery zones. See Douglas M. Johnston & Edgar Gold, Extended Jurisdiction: The Impact of
UNCLOS III on Coastal State Practice, in LAW OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL
JURISDICTION 27–46 (Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. ed., 1982).
152. See ANN L. HOLLICK, supra note 150, at 40; Alexander, supra note 140, at 567.
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freedoms and lobbied for a third convention.153 Meanwhile, the prospect of a
few nations benefiting from commercial mining in the high seas troubled
developing and landlocked nations.154 In 1973, the U.N. assembled the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).155 This conference would
not conclude until 1982.156
Entering the UNCLOS III proceedings, the U.S. delegation hoped to
restrict expansive jurisdictional claims and preserve freedoms of navigation and
overflight and the right to mine for minerals in the high seas.157 In 1976,
however, domestic concerns over foreign fishing vessels operating off U.S.
coasts motivated Congress to vote to expand U.S. authority over continental
shelves.158 With the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act (which
later came to be called the “Magnuson-Stevens Act”), Congress codified the
second 1945 Truman Proclamation and declared waters three to two hundred
nm off the shores of the United States and U.S. territorial possessions to be
exclusively under federal jurisdiction as “fishery conservation zones.”159
The enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Act led to another claim-andresponse period among coastal nations.160 The articles of the treaty that
resulted from UNCLOS III, typically referred to as the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (hereinafter the Law of the Sea treaty), incorporated the
enhanced level of authority nations now claimed over their adjacent ocean
waters and denominated the expanded jurisdictional areas, “Exclusive
Economic Zones” or EEZs.161 To these areas, nations gained the legal authority
to assert sovereign rights to the resources within the waters and seabed of their
adjacent continental shelves. According to Article 56 of the treaty,
[i]n the [EEZ], the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of
the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention
with regard to:

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See generally KALO ET AL., supra note 146, at 382–84.
See id.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 385–86.
Id. at 382–90.
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 §§ 101–102, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat.

331, 336.
160. KALO ET AL., supra note 146, at 387.
161. Id. at 390.
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(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.162
UNCLOS III came to a close in 1982, but the treaty did not go into effect
until November 16, 1994, one year after the 60th country ratified it.163 Even
though the United States was instrumental in convening UNCLOS III, to date,
it has refused to ratify the treaty largely due to concerns on the part of a few
senators that the treaty infringes upon national sovereignty and that its deep-sea
mining provisions limit free enterprise.164
Despite non-ratification, the Reagan Administration acted in full accord
with the Law of the Sea treaty in 1983 when it created the U.S. EEZ.165
Overnight, the United States secured “sovereign rights” and jurisdiction to the
largest EEZ in the world, which stretched seaward out to 200 nm from the U.S.
mainland, Hawaii and Alaska, and U.S. island territories in the Atlantic and
Pacific. A subsequent proclamation in 1988 extended the boundaries of the
territorial sea from 3 to 12 nm seaward of the coastlines of the United States
and its territories.166 President Reagan claimed full sovereignty to the 12-nm
territorial sea, from the sub-surface seabed to the above airspace.167 The last
adjustment to U.S. ocean governance boundaries came in 1999 when President
Clinton established the contiguous zone, which reaches from 12 to 24 nm from
U.S. and territorial coastlines.168 Each of the three proclamations was in

162. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, ¶ 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.
163. KALO ET AL., supra note 146, at 388.
164. In 1994, under pressure from the United States, the Convention articles regarding deep-sea
mining were amended. See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. EXEC. REP. No. 110-9, at 2 (Comm. Print 2007). As a result, the Clinton
Administration asked the Senate to ratify the treaty, but the bill died in committee, due to opposition
from Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.). See id. at 3. Currently, however, there is considerable support for
acceding to the Law of the Sea from the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, the Defense, State, and Commerce
Departments, the oil and shipping industries, fisheries groups, as well as the Joint Oceans Commission
Initiative. See id. at 8–9; see also Barack Obama’s Answers to the Top 14 Science Questions Facing
America (August 30, 2008), http://www.sciencedebate2008.com/www/index.php?id=40 (“The oceans
are a global resource and a global responsibility for which the U.S. can and should take a more active
role. I will work actively to ensure that the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Convention—an agreement
supported by more than 150 countries that will protect our economic and security interests while
providing an important international collaboration to protect the oceans and its resources.”).
165. See Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22, 23 (1983) (“The United States will exercise these
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of international law.”).
166. See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989).
167. Id. (“The territorial sea of the United States is a maritime zone extending beyond the land
territory and internal waters of the United States over which the United States exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction, a sovereignty and jurisdiction that extends to the airspace over the territorial sea, as well as
to its bed and subsoil.”).
168. See Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999).
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accordance with the Law of the Sea treaty, which the United States has
accepted as a matter of international customary law.169
At the end of the twentieth century, the global community had established
that coastal nations have full sovereignty over their internal waters and
territorial seas (zero to 12 nm seaward); sovereign rights and jurisdiction over
the waters, seabed, and resources of their EEZs (12 to 200 nm);170 and
increased jurisdiction to regulate activities within their contiguous zones (12 to
24 nm).171 In the United States, state waters offer an additional layer of
complexity: to the waters and seabeds from zero to 3 or 9 nm seaward, states
possess ownership and full sovereignty subject only to the paramount rights of
the federal government.172
B.

Sovereignty, Sovereign Rights, and Jurisdiction

While speculation as to the exact meaning of “sovereign rights” is perhaps
best left to the political philosophers and to the lawyers, it appears that the
EEZ notion of sovereign rights brings with it the idea of more
responsibility for the common property resources found in the ocean—an
increased role of public or common stewardship.173
To understand whether the suite of rights the United States asserted over
ocean waters in the twentieth century is sufficient to support asserting public
trust duties and responsibilities over the resources within those waters
necessitates a closer look at the twentieth century presidential proclamations,
judicial opinions, and legislation concerning sovereignty in the oceans. What
are the necessary pre-conditions for the existence of the public trust? Is
ownership required or is sovereignty over resources sufficient to support the
public trust doctrine? In England, the public trust doctrine was based on the
Crown’s absolute sovereignty over tidal waters.174 Must the U.S. government
169. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 514 cmt. a. (1987) (“Recent
practice of states, supported by the broad consensus achieved at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, has effectively established as customary law the concept of the exclusive economic
zone, the width of the zone (up to two hundred nautical miles), and the basic rules governing it. These
are binding, therefore, on states generally even before the LOS Convention comes into effect and
thereafter even as to states not party to the Convention.”); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900) (stating that in the absence of executive or legislative action, customary international law
substitutes for U.S. domestic law); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (stating that “[t]he
[United States Supreme] Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities
as instructive for its interpretation of [its laws]”).
170. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 162, at arts. 3, 57.
171. See Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (“[T]he United States may
exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea . . . .”); see also United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, supra note 162, art. 33.
172. See infra notes 180–183 and accompanying text.
173. Biliana Cicin-Sain & Robert W. Knecht, The Problem of Governance of U.S. Ocean
Resources and the New Exclusive Economic Zone, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 289, 307 (1985).
174. See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821) (“[T]he navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs
and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land under the
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also enjoy absolute sovereignty over the seabed and waters of the EEZ for it to
be invested with public trust doctrine protections?
Crucial to this discussion is an understanding of “sovereignty.”
Fundamental to international law, sovereignty refers to the legal right of a
nation to exercise power over its territory.175 Sovereignty is “a modern notion
of political authority . . . . The state is the political institution in which
sovereignty is embodied.”176 International law provides that nations possess
“permanent sovereignty” over their natural resources.177 This principle arose in
the context of decolonization in the 1950s. Today, permanent sovereignty over
natural resources is considered to be a “basic constituent of the right [of
nations] to self-determination,”178 and, therefore, essential to a nation’s
economic sovereignty and development.179
In the United States, coastal states have sovereignty over their nearshore
ocean waters.180 Congress granted this sovereignty in 1953 with the Submerged
Lands Act, which extended the sovereignty of states over their “lands beneath
navigable waters” to include the ocean seabed out to 3 nm off the coastlines of
Atlantic and Pacific states and nine nm off the shores of Texas and Florida’s
west coast.181 It then granted states “title to and ownership of the lands beneath
navigable waters within [their] boundaries . . . and the natural resources within
such lands and waters.”182 The sovereign rights states enjoy to resources in and
under their waters are subject only to the paramount rights retained by the

water . . . vests in the sovereign, but it vests in him for the sake of order and protection, and not for his
own use, but for the use of the citizen . . . .”).
175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 206 cmt. b (1987) (“‘Sovereignty’
is a term used in many senses and is much abused. As used here, it implies a [nation's] lawful control
over its territory generally to the exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that territory, and
authority to apply law there.”).
176. Sovereignty, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2003), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/.
177. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962)
(declaring that the “right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the
people of the State concerned”).
178. See Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship Between “Permanent Sovereignty” and the
Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 ENVTL. L. 1187, 1190 (1996)
(quoting INT’L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE, MONTREAL 196 (1982)); MILAN
BULAJIĆ, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 82,
263, 284 (2d rev. ed. 1993); see also Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International
Law, 162 RECUEIL DES COURS 245, 255 (1979).
179. See Perrez, supra note 178, at 1190 (“The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources is ‘a fundamental principle of contemporary international law.’”) (quoting Kamal Hossain,
Introduction, in PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW i, ix
(Kamal Hossain & Subrata Roy Chowdhury eds., 1984)).
180. See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a).
181. See id. § 1301(b).
182. See id. § 1311(a)(1).
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federal government in matters of interstate commerce and navigation,
international affairs, and national defense.183
Waters of the territorial sea, as well as the submerged lands beneath them,
are subject to the full sovereignty of the U.S. federal government.184 Language
in the several treaties that shaped the twentieth century ocean enclosure
movement indicates that the U.N. intended for a nation’s sovereignty over its
territorial sea to be as absolute as that which it has over its land territory and
internal waters.185 On the other hand, in its contiguous zone, the United States
does not enjoy full sovereign authority. Instead, it exercises a level of rights
that is essentially the same as that which it exercises in its EEZ—sovereign
rights and jurisdiction. The only difference is that in the contiguous zone, the
United States enjoys the power to enforce certain of its laws to “prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea.”186 The contiguous zone,
therefore, serves as a buffer to protect the sovereignty of the United States and
other nations within their territories and territorial seas.
The “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” that the U.S. possesses over its
EEZ are not as complete as the rights characteristic of full sovereignty.187 The

183. See id. § 1314(a) (“The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and
powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of
commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but
shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management,
administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources which are specifically
. . . vested in and assigned to the respective States . . . .”).
184. See Legal Issues Raised by Proposed Presidential Proclamation To Extend the Territorial Sea,
12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 238, 240 (1988) (“Indeed, a nation has the same sovereignty over the
territorial sea as it has over its land territory.”) (citations omitted); see also, Proclamation No. 5928, 54
Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989) (defining the territorial sea of the United States as “a maritime zone . . .
over which the United States exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction, a sovereignty and jurisdiction that
extends to the airspace over the territorial sea, as well as to its bed and subsoil”). But, c.f.,
Administration of Coral Reef Resources in the Northwest Hawaiian Islands, 2000 O.L.C. LEXIS 30
(2000) [hereinafter Administration of Coral Reef Resources], at *7–13, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/coralreef.htm (discussing the various executive, legislative and judicial
opinions on whether Proclamation 5928 alone extended sovereignty to the 12-nm limit, and concluding
that “the proclamation, acting alone, does not extend the reach of a statute unless Congress intended that
the statute be linked to the extent of the territorial sea as that area may be defined at any given time”);
Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989) (“Nothing in this Proclamation . . . extends or
otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations
derived therefrom . . . .”).
185. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zone, art. 1, ¶
1, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (“The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and
its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea.”), cited nearly
word for word in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 162, at art. 2.
186. Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999); see id. (“Extension of the
contiguous zone of the United States to the limits permitted by international law will advance the law
enforcement and public health interests of the United States.”); see also United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, supra note 162, at art. 33, ¶ 1(a).
187. See Administration of Coral Reef Resources, supra note 184, at *30–31 (“Comments to the
Restatement explain that although coastal [nations] do not have sovereignty over the EEZ, they do
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Law of the Sea treaty placed clear limitations on the rights of coastal nations to
the seabeds and waters of their EEZs.188 It stipulated that nations must grant
other nations the freedom of navigation and overflight, and the right to lay
submarine cables and pipelines in their EEZs, which President Reagan’s
Proclamation fully acknowledged.189 Both international and domestic law have
since considered the EEZ to be an area in which a nation possesses sovereign
rights over the natural resources but which is “beyond [its] territory and
territorial sea.”190 In 1986, a U.N. study of global EEZ-related legislation
concluded:
The [EEZ] is subject to a “specific régime.” The régime is specific in the
sense that the legal régime of the [EEZ] is different from both the territorial
sea and the high seas. It is a zone which partakes of some of the
characteristics of both régimes but belongs to neither.191
Nonetheless, it is clear that the nature of the “sovereign rights” of the
United States to the resources of its EEZ is wide-ranging. Pursuant to the Law
of the Sea treaty, nations have authority to exploit, manage, and conserve the
living and non-living resources of their EEZs.192 In 2000, Assistant Attorney
General Randolph Moss concluded, “The United States, in sum, exerts greater
restraining and directing influence over the EEZ than any other sovereign
entity, and that influence, as an overall matter, is extensive.”193
Though the Law of the Sea treaty and associated customary international
law make no express mention of property rights,194 it is evident that certain
possess sovereign rights for specific purposes.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 514 cmt. c (1987)).
188. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 162, at art. 58, ¶ 1.
189. See id.; see Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22, 23 (1983); but see Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Disappearing Right to Navigational Freedom in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 29 MARINE POL’Y 107,
121 (2005) (In recent years, nations have prevented ships carrying hazardous nuclear cargoes and singlehulled oil tankers from traveling through their EEZs; fishing vessels traveling through many countries’
EEZs must declare their intentions to prevent possible seizure. “A new norm of customary international
law appears to have emerged that allows coastal states to regulate navigation through their EEZ based on
the nature of the ship and its cargo.”).
190. See Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. at 23; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 162, at art. 55.
191. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SEC’Y-GEN. FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE
LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, THE ECONOMIC ZONE,
AND THE EXCLUSIVE FISHERY ZONE iv (1986).
192. But cf. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 162, at art. 62, ¶ 2
(stating that should a nation not be able to fully utilize the living resources within its EEZ, it “shall . . .
give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch”). The prospect of fishery surpluses seems
quaint, given declines of fish populations worldwide. See, e.g., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, IN DEAD
WATER: MERGING OF CLIMATE CHANGE WITH POLLUTION, OVER-HARVEST, AND INFESTATIONS IN THE
WORLD’S FISHING GROUNDS 10 (Christian Nellemann et al. eds., 2008).
193. Administration of Coral Reef Resources, supra note 184, at *36.
194. Property rights are often likened to a bundle of sticks, which connotes the many aspects of
“property.” See Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving Problems Arising in
Human/Environmental Relations, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 6 (2007) (“[S]tructures of property rights are
made up of bundles of rights that can be and often are separated or combined in complex ways. At a
minimum, these bundles include possessory rights or the entitlements of ownership per se, usufructuary
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property rights accompanied the extension of nations’ sovereignty over their
neighboring seas.195 In the United States, the legal framework that initially
created these rights reaches back to the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA).196 The OCSLA established a procedure for the sale of five-year
leases for oil and gas development that carried exclusionary rights and provided
companies with extensive security of investment.197 Today, the United States
and other nations exercise use, possessory, and, to a large degree, disposition
and exclusionary rights to the pelagic and benthic resources and seabeds of
their territorial seas and EEZs.198 The United States exercises (as well as
conveys) these property rights to marine resources by granting rights to private
interests (e.g., fishing permits to fishermen and leases to oil companies) to use
areas and resources of the EEZ (use); collecting rents from these private
interests in exchange for the right to use EEZ resources (possessory);
permitting fishermen to sell or exchange Individual Fishing Quotas and leases
(disposition); and, excluding other nations’ fishing boats from accessing fish
resources in the U.S. EEZ, as well as granting private interests exclusive rights
to resources or areas of the seabed (exclusionary).199
Though nations have often “behaved as owners of the seabed” by leasing
tracts of the seabed for oil and gas exploration and exploitation to private firms,
Professor Gail Osherenko concludes that in doing so, nations are “actually
[just] exercising [their] sovereign rights to regulate exploration and
production.”200 Two Ninth Circuit appellate court cases, Native Village of Eyak
v. Trawler Diane Marie201 and Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v.

rights or rights to make use of property in specified ways, exclusion rights or rights to prevent others
from using property without permission, and disposition rights or rights to dispose of property according
to the wishes of the owner.”).
195. See Osherenko, supra note 40, at 330–34.
196. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 462
(codified as amended in 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1356a (2006)).
197. See id. (stating the purpose of the Act is “[t]o provide for the jurisdiction of the United States
over the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf, and to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
lease such lands for certain purposes”); see also id. §§ 1335(a)(10), 1337 (b)(2) (stating that leases
should last no longer than five years unless the Secretary finds that a longer period is necessary); see
also MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, STRATEGIC PLAN 2007–2012, at 6 (2007)
(In 2006, the MMS managed 8140 leases on the continental shelf.); see also Osherenko, supra note 40,
at 340–41 (“Exploring, exploiting, and activities such as production of energy . . . usually require
ownership or property rights. Economic investments normally are not undertaken without secure rights
to recoup and even profit from the investment.”).
198. See Osherenko, supra note 40, at 330–34.
199. See id. at 332–33.
200. Id. at 341. See also id. at 361 (A lease issued pursuant to the OCSLA “does convey a property
interest enforceable against the Government, of course, but it is an interest lacking many of the attributes
of private property.”) (footnote omitted).
201. 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Alaskan native villages’ aboriginal rights to fish
populations and minerals within their traditional use area—now in the U.S. territorial sea and EEZ—are
subordinate to the U.S. federal government’s paramount rights to all resources and lands in federal
waters).

1 - TURNIPSEED

36

4/23/2009 9:10:49 AM

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 36:1

United States,202 recently affirmed that the rights of all parties in the U.S. EEZ
are incident to the paramount sovereign rights—not ownership—of the federal
government over the seabed and marine resources.203 The holdings in both
decisions cited United States v. Texas, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court
determined “this is an instance where property interests are so subordinated to
the rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty.”204
However, the question of property rights in federal waters does not stray
far from discussions of sovereignty, and disentangling the two remains
difficult.205 Gail Osherenko contends that “[t]he Supreme Court and Congress
have on occasion blurred the distinction between sovereignty (authority) and
ownership (property rights).”206 Notwithstanding some language of the courts
to the contrary,207 she concludes that the United States did not gain fee simple
202. 399 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the declaration of ownership of submerged
lands, implied by the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands’ Submerged Lands Act and Marine
Sovereignty Act of 1980, “is directly contrary to [U.S.] federal law”).
203. The federal “paramountcy doctrine” is derived from four Supreme Court cases in which
coastal states and the federal government clashed over rights of authority and ownership to the resources
and seabed of the territorial sea. See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950) (“As we
pointed out in United States v. California, the issue in this class of litigation does not turn on title or
ownership in the conventional sense. . . . Protection and control of the area are indeed functions of
national external sovereignty. The marginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National interests,
national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national defense,
relations with other powers, war and peace focus there. National rights must therefore be paramount in
that area.” (citing United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31–34 (1947))); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29,
as recognized in United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 15 n.2 (1969); United States v. Maine, 420
U.S. 515, 524–28 (1975) (holding that the paramount rights of the federal government to the continental
shelf seabed were not only pursuant to the Constitution but were also confirmed by the Submerged
Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, both of 1953).
204. Native Village of Eyak v. Daley 154 F.3d 1090, 1093 (1998) (citing United States v. Texas,
339 U.S. at 719); N. Mariana Islands, 399 F.3d at 1061 (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719);
see also Osherenko, supra note 40, at 359–60.
205. One commentator has concluded that differentiating between the two is “at least in part, a
semantic problem: ‘property’ and ‘sovereignty’ are seldom more than conclusory ciphers loaded with
ideological baggage.” Dale D. Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public Trust,
and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 852 (2005).
206. Osherenko, supra note 40, at 330. In 1953, the Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, which declared that “the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided.” 43
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006). Though “appertain” can be interpreted to mean “belong,” “a more apt
meaning . . . is that the [O]uter [C]ontinental [S]helf is connected to the United States geographically,
geologically, and functionally.” Osherenko, supra note 40, at 354 (footnote omitted).
207. See, e.g., N. Mariana Islands, 399 F.3d at 1063 (“[D]espite the national concerns underlying
the paramountcy doctrine, Congress can transfer ownership of submerged lands to the states or other
entities. Congress has done so in the past [with the Submerged Lands Act].”) (citations omitted); id. at
1064 (“A strong presumption of national authority over seaward submerged lands runs throughout the
paramountcy doctrine cases, and we extend that same presumption to the case at hand. Absent express
indication to the contrary, the ownership of seaward submerged lands accompanies United States
sovereignty.”) (footnote omitted); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–74 (1954) (finding that
Congress “not only has legislative power over the public domain [which includes the continental shelf
seabed], but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein. Congress may deal with such lands
precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them from
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ownership over the continental shelf seabed with the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act and the Law of the Sea treaty.208 Her argument is consistent with
current interpretations of international law that the rights of nations over their
territorial seas and EEZs extend not from proprietorship but from
sovereignty209 and with language of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s General Counsel, stating that the United States does not own
the EEZ “in the traditional property sense.”210
Staying away from the complicated nature of property rights in U.S.
waters, is the combined exercise of sovereignty in the territorial sea and
“sovereign rights” in the EEZ sufficient to support a federal public trust
doctrine? Many commentators, including judges, have asserted that it is:
A State may care for its own in utilizing the bounties of nature within her
borders because it has technical ownership of such bounties or, when
ownership is in no one, because the State may for the common good
exercise all the authority that technical ownership ordinarily confers.—
Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson211
The formal establishment of sovereign rights [over the resources of the
EEZ] arguably carries with it an increased role of public stewardship over
these resources.—Professor Casey Jarman212
In my judgment, the public trust doctrine naturally extended from
navigable waters and the territorial sea to the EEZ with the expansion of
U.S. sovereign rights over this area.—Professor Gail Osherenko213
The message is simple: The sovereign rights of nation-states over certain
environmental resources are not proprietary, but fiduciary.—Professor
Peter Sand214
sale.”). But cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22 (1947) (in which the federal government
argued that the U.S. “is the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of paramount rights in and powers over,
the lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the Pacific Ocean [in the territorial sea]”)
(emphasis added), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Weeren, 607 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Cal.
1980); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 520–21 (1975) (in discussing questions of authority over
the continental shelf seabed, the Court reiterated that “‘this class of litigation does not turn on title or
ownership in the conventional sense’”) (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 669, 704 (1950)).
See generally Osherenko, supra note 40, at 336–62 for a more complete treatment of property rights in
the seas under domestic and international law.
208. See Osherenko, supra note 40, at 362 (“In the oceans, the federal government . . . has authority
to grant limited property rights that fall short of ownership through leases, easements, concessions, or
other instruments. But government does not have the authority to transfer ownership of ocean space to
private entities.”) (footnote omitted).
209. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 162; Peter H.
Sand, Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Common Pool Resources?, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL.
47, 48 (2004) [hereinafter Sand, Sovereignty Bounded].
210. Administration of Coral Reef Resources, supra note 184, at *39 (citing Letter from James
Dorskind, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. to Randolph Moss, Acting Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel (July 24, 2000)).
211. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (concurring opinion).
212. Jarman, supra note 40, at 2.
213. Osherenko, supra note 40, at 370.
214. See Sand, Sovereignty Bounded, supra note 209, at 48–49.
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Jurisprudence concerning the public trust doctrine also reveals that it is
possible to discern public trust duties solely from rights of sovereignty. The
first case to apply the public trust doctrine to navigable waters, Arnold v.
Mundy (1821), established that the “right of fishery” was “one of the incidents
of sovereignty vested in the people [of New Jersey]” upon Independence.215 In
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell (1842), the court agreed that “[w]hen the
Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign;
and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the
soils under them . . . .”216 Later, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois
(1892), the U.S. Supreme Court concurred that public trust lands are held “by
the people in trust for their common use and of common right as an incident of
their sovereignty.”217
Wildlife jurisprudence also supports this argument; in U.S. wildlife law,
ownership of a wild animal is impossible until capture.218 Therefore,
sovereignty, not ownership, provides the necessary degree of rights to manage
wildlife in the interest of the public trust.219 In the U.S. Supreme Court case,
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commission, Chief Justice Burger clarified
in his concurring opinion:
The doctrine that a State “owns” the wildlife within its borders as trustee
for its citizens is admittedly a legal anachronism . . . . But . . . the doctrine
is not completely obsolete. It manifests the State’s special interest in
regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citizens. Whether
we describe this interest as proprietary or otherwise is not significant.220
A similar holding was reached in the U.S. District Court decision of In re
Steuart Transportation, whereby the court stated “the state certainly has a
sovereign interest in preserving wildlife resources,”221 and “[s]uch right does
not derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the
people.”222
U.S. policy makers recognize that sovereign rights over marine resources
oblige the United States to protect those resources. Assistant Attorney General
Moss discussed these rights in his considerations preceding the establishment
of the Northwest Hawaiian Islands National Monument, and stated that

215.
216.
217.
218.

6 N.J.L. 1, 4–5 (1821).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
146 U.S. 387, 459–60 (1892).
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335–36 (1979), overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519 (1896) (overruling Geer on the grounds that ownership of wildlife is impossible until it is
reduced to capture but noting that “the general rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for
preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for
conservation and protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state
ownership”).
219. See id.
220. 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978).
221. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
222. Id.
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“although [nations] do not have [full] sovereignty over the EEZ, they do
possess sovereign rights for specific purposes. One of these purposes is the
conservation of the ‘natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the
superjacent waters.’”223
Though the United States clearly possesses an ample degree of
sovereignty to regulate resource use in its territorial sea and EEZ, the question
arises whether the international community would support an extension of the
U.S. public trust doctrine over those resources. In this regard, it is notable that
many international treaties treat marine environmental protection as having
paramount importance.224 For instance, the Law of the Sea treaty intimates that
its root purpose is to enhance stewardship of global marine resources through
the recognition of nations’ rights to the resources of their adjacent oceans.225
Since the drafting of the treaty, customary international law has evolved to
afford coastal nations greater ability to regulate activities in their EEZs to
protect their marine resources.226 Many coastal nations now regulate traffic
through their EEZs based on the type of ship, the cargo, and the potential for
damage to marine ecosystems.227 A case could therefore be made that today’s
customary international maritime law expects countries to serve as better
stewards of their marine resources. Assistant Attorney General Moss concurs:
223. Administration of Coral Reef Resources, supra note 184, at *30–31 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 514(1)(a), cmt. c (1987)). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 514 cmt. f (1987) (“The coastal state is obligated to ensure, through proper
conservation and management measures, that living resources in the exclusive economic zone are not
endangered by over-exploitation.”).
224. See, e.g., International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 4 Bevans 248,
161 U.N.T.S. 2124; Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl
Habitat (Ramsar), Feb. 2 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11084, 996 U.N.T.S. 14583 (1971); United Nations
Convention on the Human Environment, 21st Plenary Meeting, Stockholm, June 16, 1972, Declaration
on the Human Environment; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
Sept. 11, 1980, T.I.A.S. 10240, 1329 U.N.T.S. 22301; United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 162; Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. 103-20, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993); Convention for the Protection
of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1072.
225. The preamble establishes that the Convention seeks to create “a legal order for the seas and
oceans which will . . . promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and
preservation of the marine environment.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note
162, at preamble. The Law of the Sea Convention also clearly unites sovereign rights to exploit marine
resources with an obligation to do so sustainably: “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural
resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and
preserve the marine environment.” Id. at art. 193 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., id. at art. 61, ¶ 2
(“The coastal State . . . shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by overexploitation.”); id. at art. 192 (“States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment.”); id. at art. 194, ¶ 5 (dictating that coastal nations shall take actions “necessary to protect
and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered
species and other forms of marine life”).
226. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 189.
227. For example, the International Maritime Organization has recently upheld the efforts of
countries to ban ships carrying nuclear waste from their EEZs. Id. at 108–12.
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[T]he United States possesses substantial authority under international law
to regulate the EEZ for the purpose of protecting the marine environment.
This is true under customary international law . . . which appears not only
to allow the United States to take action to protect marine resources, but
also to require some such actions.228
The language of the Law of the Sea treaty and the trend of international
law to prioritize environmental protection support an extension of the public
trust doctrine to the outer borders of the U.S. EEZ. As an internal mechanism to
fulfill treaty (as well as domestic) obligations, an explicit extension of the
public trust doctrine to the resources of the U.S. territorial sea and EEZ could
be established on the basis of sovereignty—not ownership—and, thus, would
not likely be contested by the international community.

C.

The Question of a Federal Public Trust Doctrine

Though we have established that sovereignty (3 to 12 nm) and sovereign
rights (12 to 200 nm) bestow an adequate degree of authority to extend the U.S.
public trust doctrine to the resources of federally managed ocean waters, there
remains yet another unresolved issue. A federal, as opposed to a state, public
trust doctrine has never been explicitly created. While it is clear that the state
governments assumed public trust duties upon Independence from England,229
there is an open question whether the federal government also inherited a
separate public trust obligation to manage federal lands and resources for the
benefit of the U.S. citizenry.230
Many commentators have pointed to Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois for evidence that the early judiciary believed there to be a federal
version of the public trust doctrine.231 In the 1890s, the Illinois Legislature sold
roughly two square miles of submerged lands along the Chicago waterfront to

228. Administration of Coral Reef Resources, supra note 184, at *36–37 (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 514(b)(iii) (1987)).
229. See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 416 (1842) (“[W]hen the people of
New Jersey took possession of the reins of government [after the American Revolution], and took into
their own hands the power of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before belonged either
to the crown or the Parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested in the State.”).
230. See Roady, supra note 133, at 41. Commentator Mark Dowie has suggested that the fact that
the Supreme Court has not had occasion to declare the public trust doctrine a federal common law
“doesn’t mean that [it] is not federal; it just means it has never been established as such.” Mark Dowie,
Salmon and the Caesar: Will a Doctrine from the Roman Empire Sink Ocean Aquaculture?, LEGAL
AFF., Sept./Oct. 2004, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2004/
termsofart_sepoct04.msp.
231. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 43, at 453 n.118 (“The wide variety of law argued in brief by
the attorneys indicates the inconsequential role played by the law of Illinois in the analysis of the case.”)
(citing Briefs of Appellant Illinois Cent. R.R., Briefs of the City of Chicago, and Briefs of Illinois,
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)); id. at 454 (“The Illinois Central opinion itself leaves
little doubt that the Court conceived of a general trust that applied to all states. . . . In describing the
trust, the Court made it clear that the trust derives from federal law and is binding on all states . . . .”);
infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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the Illinois Central Railroad Company.232 A few years later, the legislature
rescinded the sale, and the railroad sued to quiet its title to the land.233 The
court case that ensued quickly moved through the lower courts to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which ruled that the sale was void because the Illinois
Legislature had never possessed the power to abdicate public trust lands in the
first place.234 After taking a close look at the historical context of Illinois
Central, commentators Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill concluded that the
prospect of the early Court interpreting the public trust doctrine as being
grounded in federal law was, at the very least, “not frivolous”:
All parties and courts had acknowledged that the federal government had
ultimate control over navigation in the Chicago harbor, and the desire to
preserve free navigation was the root policy underlying the public trust
doctrine. The federal government had filed three lawsuits that played a
critical role in the evolution of the controversy, and a federal regulator had
made the decision that precipitated the litigation that finally reached the
Supreme Court. Whether any of these facts, or all in combination, might
justify a federal rule of decision is a topic for another day. But they surely
suggest that the possibility is not frivolous—at least if the doctrine is
confined to the controversies over lands beneath navigable waters.235
Two federal district court cases decided in the 1980s, In re Complaint of
Steuart Transportation Co.236 and United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land,237 also
intimated that a federal public trust doctrine exists. In In re Steuart, the state of
Virginia and the federal government both sought to recover monetary damages
for harm to migratory birds killed when an oil barge spilled thousands of
gallons of crude oil into the Chesapeake Bay.238 Concluding that both levels of
government possessed public trust responsibilities, the court held that “[u]nder
the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have the
right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural
wildlife resources.”239
In United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, the federal government sought to
condemn waterfront property in Boston Harbor for use by the U.S. Coast
Guard.240 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts argued that the federal
232. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 800.
233. See id. at 801.
234. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453 (“A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State
has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would
be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.”).
235. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 48, at 929.
236. 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
237. 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981).
238. 495 F. Supp. at 38.
239. Id. at 40 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Burlington N.R.R., 710 F. Supp. 1286,
1287 (D. Neb. 1989) (concluding that the federal government could recover damages to a wildfowl
production area under parens patriae and that the public trust doctrine, though “traditionally . . . asserted
by the States,” applies to the federal government).
240. 523 F. Supp. at 124.
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government could not condemn the lands, because doing so would vitiate the
public trust inherent in the adjacent submerged lands. The court disagreed,
holding that the federal government could acquire the lands for “full fee
simple”—which included the inalienable public trust burden, the jus publicum,
in addition to the transferable jus privatum (i.e., private property rights).241
An additional court has tackled (or, rather, expressly avoided) the issue of
a federal public trust doctrine. In District of Columbia v. Air Florida the
District sought on appeal to recover damages from the crash of an Air Florida
plane into the Potomac River in 1982.242 Claiming that the U.S. Congress had
delegated its federal public trust duties for the Potomac River to the District,
the District argued that “Air Florida owed the city a duty of care regarding the
river which was breached by the crash.”243 The court declined to rule whether a
federal common law public trust doctrine applied, given that the District had
raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Explaining that the issue of a
federal public trust doctrine was complex, the court deferred judgment:
[T]he argument that public trust duties pertain to federal navigable waters
. . . raises a number of very difficult issues concerning the rights and
obligations of the United States . . . [and] the creation of federal common
law . . . . [W]e therefore leave the resolution of these issues to another day
and another case.244
Thus, the Air Florida decision dodged the threshold question: wherein
does the federal public trust doctrine invoked in Illinois Central, In re Steuart,
and 1.58 Acres originate? Commentators have located a federal public trust
doctrine in constitutional provisions,245 as well as in various statutes246 and
federal common law arguments.247 We believe that a fundamental source for a
federal public trust doctrine is the U.S. Constitution.
241. Id. at 125 (“[T]he federal government is as restricted as the [state] in its ability to abdicate to
private individuals its sovereign jus publicum in the land.”).
242. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
243. Id. at 1078.
244. Id. at 1078–79.
245. See infra notes 248–255 and accompanying text. In addition to the arguments mentioned in the
text, Professors George Smith and Michael Sweeney have argued that a federal public trust doctrine
extends from the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which reserve in the people all powers and rights that
are not expressly given to the government. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”); U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also
George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations
Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 317 (2006) (“[T]he language of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments refers to rights and powers that are retained by the ‘people,’ such as the fundamental
right of the populace to preserve natural resources. The end result is a Constitution that not only
emphasizes individual property rights, but also recognizes the right of ‘sovereign people’ to collectively
‘determine the highest and best use of land and natural resources.’”) (citing Victor John Yannacone, Jr.,
Agricultural Lands, Fertile Soils, Popular Sovereignty, the Trust Doctrine, Environmental Impact
Assessment and the Natural Law, 51 N.D. L. REV. 615, 618 (1975)).
246. See infra note 262.
247. See infra notes 268–280 and accompanying text.
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Constitutional theories find root most centrally in the Commerce Clause,
which provides authority to the federal government to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce in navigable waterways.248 The U.S. Supreme Court first
articulated this authority in the 1824 Gibbons v. Ogden decision.249 In the
1960s, the Court affirmed that:
[t]he Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in
connection with navigable waters. ‘The power to regulate commerce
comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all
the navigable waters of the United States . . . . For this purpose they are the
public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by
Congress.’250
Professor Charles Wilkinson has argued that the public trust doctrine lies
“parallel and complementary” to the navigation servitude:
[T]he public trust doctrine prevents the substantial impairment of public
rights in navigable waterways . . . while the navigation servitude prevents
the acquisition of compensable private interest in navigable waterways . . . .
[G]iven implied state ownership [of submerged lands beneath navigable
waterways], the most sensible reconciliation of federal and states’ rights
under the Constitution recognizes both the public trust servitude and the
navigation servitude as federal prerogatives encompassed by the commerce
clause.251
An additional constitutional basis for a federal public trust doctrine is
found in the Property Clause.252 The Property Clause provides a basis for the
“paramountcy doctrine,” first established in United States v. California, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal government possessed
“paramount rights in and powers over” the then 3-nm territorial sea.253

248. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
249. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
250. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122–23 (1967) (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866)).
251. Wilkinson, supra note 43, at 459 n.138. See also id. at 425 (noting there are fifty-one public
trust doctrines, with the fifty-first resting in the Commerce Clause); id. at 459 (“For more than 150
years, the Supreme Court has consistently given a constitutional cast to state and federal prerogatives
and obligations with regard to waters navigable for title, due ultimately to the key role of these
watercourses in the country’s commerce and society and in the formation of the national government.
Thus . . . the fairest and most principled conclusion is that the public trust doctrine is rooted in the
commerce clause and became binding on new states at statehood.”).
252. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Congress has the authority “to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”); see also United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704–05 (9th Cir. 1978) (calling the
government the “constitutional trustee,” the court cited the property clause when it proclaimed that
“public lands are held in trust by the federal government”).
253. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22, 38–39 (1947) (“[T]he Federal Government rather
than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion
over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil.”), superseded by statute, 43 U.S.C. §§
1301–15 (2006). The “paramountcy doctrine” is analogous to the federal navigation servitude over
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According to Assistant Attorney General Moss, sovereignty and sovereign
rights provide sufficient authority over the territorial sea and EEZ, respectively,
for Congress to regulate them under the Property Clause:
Congress’s power under the Property Clause is not limited to making rules
and regulations to govern property that the Government owns in fee simple.
The Property Clause authorizes Congress to take actions to protect and
govern some lesser property interests as well . . . . [W]e believe that the
significant amount of control and sovereign rights that the United States
possesses over the EEZ are sufficient to authorize Congress to make rules
and regulations governing the EEZ, at least with respect to protecting
marine resources.254
Similarly, language in U.S. Department of the Interior regulations supports
the notion that the right of the federal government to govern submerged lands
in national parks is constitutional in nature:
In some park areas, the United States holds title to the submerged lands
under navigable water. In other park areas, the United States does not hold
title to the submerged lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries
of the park; federal authority to regulate within the ordinary reach of these
waters is based on the commerce and property clauses of the U.S.
Constitution, not ownership.255
Thus, there is constitutional support for federal authority over submerged
lands not regulated by the states. But, does this authority (or “sovereignty”)
inexorably beget trusteeship duties? Two historical authorities, Arnold v.
Mundy256 and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,257 provide support for the
notion that the trust responsibilities of government are inextricable from the
sovereign authority of government. In Arnold, the New Jersey Supreme Court
declared:
[T]his power, which may be thus exercised by the sovereignty of the state,
is nothing more than . . . the right of regulating, improving, and securing
for the common benefit of every individual citizen. The sovereign power
itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles of the law of nature
and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common
right.258
In Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court held that public
trust duties necessarily follow governmental authority:
inland navigable waters. See United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123–24 (D. Mass.
1981). See also supra note 203.
254. Administration of Coral Reef Resources, supra note 184, at *39–40.
255. General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service and National Park
System Units in Alaska, 61 Fed Reg. 35,133, 35,134 (July 5, 1996) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1,
13).
256. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
257. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
258. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78.
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The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost . . . .
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than it
can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace.259
In the United States, the sovereign authority to govern is shared between
the states and the federal government. We suggest, therefore, that a dual
trusteeship of U.S. public trust resources follows this co-sovereign system; and,
it is in this context that a federal public trust doctrine is best located. If state
public trust duties accompany the sovereign authority of state governments to
govern, then it follows that a federal public trust burden also conveys with the
sovereign authority of the federal government to govern. This idea follows
language in United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, in which the court recognized
this bifurcation of trusteeship duties between state and federal governments:
This formulation recognizes the division of sovereignty between the state
and federal governments those aspects of the public interest in the tideland
and the land below the low water mark that relate to the commerce and
other powers delegated to the federal government are administered by
Congress in its capacity as trustee of the jus publicum, while those aspects
of the public interest in this property that relate to nonpreempted subjects
reserved to local regulation by the states are administered by state
legislatures in their capacity as co-trustee of the jus publicum.260
Other support for this formulation exists. Federal courts have played an
important role in interpreting public trust principles, supervising state trustees,
and preventing state agencies from conveying trust lands free of public trust
obligations.261 Federal statutory authorities contain language also evocative of
a co-trusteeship formulation.262 The counterfactual, according to Professor
259.
260.
261.
262.

Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 453.
United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 1981).
See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 154–61.
See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 43 U.S.C. § 1332
(declaring that the continental shelf is to be “held by the Federal Government for the public”);
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801–1891 (2006); American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“Pursuant to the [1986 Amendments of the] Magnuson Act, the ‘conservation and management
of the EEZ’ belongs to the sovereign . . . .”). In addition, some federal statutory authorities pertaining to
public terrestrial lands contain language suggestive of a federal public trust doctrine. See, e.g., Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1713(a)(3) (2006) (allowing sale of public domain lands
only when the “disposal of such tract will serve important public objectives”); see also Susan D. Baer,
The Public Trust Doctrine – A Tool to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of
Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 385 (1988) (discussing the various federal
lands statutes that intimate federal trust duties); Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal
Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine: Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty? 19 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 69 (1998) (arguing that the court should be able to assemble a trust duty for
federal agencies from the language of the National Environmental Policy Act); Babcock, supra note 36,
at 55–59 (discussing federal lands statutes and the courts that have used public trust language to interpret
them). See also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2006) (“The President, or the authorized
representative of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of the natural resources to recover
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Wilkinson, is illustrative: “[i]t does not make sense that a state could abdicate
. . . [the] trust completely.”263 This logic, thus, implies that the public trust
doctrine is both federal and constitutional:
The standards for the trust, then, are best understood as having very broad
parameters set as a matter of federal mandate . . . ; [and], the constitutional
[basis for the public trust doctrine] is more consonant with the whole body
of law. The traditional trust allows the states wide latitude, but the states
are federally prohibited from abrogating the public trust entirely.264
This authority of the federal government to assert public trust
responsibilities derives from the constitutional bifurcation of sovereignty
between it and the states. Furthermore, there is ample support that public
trusteeship duties are inextricable from sovereign authority. We believe that the
public trust duties already inhering in the federal government as a result of its
sovereignty can be used to construct a public trust doctrine for federal ocean
resources. However, implementing federal public trust responsibilities in the
territorial sea and EEZ will likely require developing a combination of new
federal common law, statutory authorities, and executive branch initiatives.
D.

Common Law or Statutory Authority; Principles or Doctrine?

Judicial interpretation, federal statute, or executive action could establish a
public trust doctrine that extends to the borders of federally controlled ocean
waters.265 Traditionally, the judiciary has set the scope and substance of states’
public trust doctrines; thus, the question of federal common law is material to
any discussion about a federal public trust doctrine.266 In addition, many states
have codified public trust doctrine principles in state statutes and in their
constitutions. These states—whose common law public trust doctrines are
for the costs of replacing or restoring such resources. Sums recovered shall be used to restore,
rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of the
Federal government, or the State government.”).
263. See Wilkinson, supra note 43, at 461.
264. See id. at 464. Federal courts have “define[d] and limit[ed] the scope of state action pursuant
to the public trust doctrine, principally through the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United
States Constitution and the doctrine of preemption.” ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 154 n.81.
265. This Part focuses on the possibility of creating a federal common law through common law or
statutory law. However, executive action—through executive order or presidential proclamation—is
another possible route. There is precedent for the use of executive orders to further conservation goals.
Examples include President George W. Bush’s Executive Order that agencies engage in “cooperative
conservation” (Executive Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 30, 2004)) and President
Clinton’s Executive Orders to develop a national system of marine protected areas (Exec. Order No.
13,158, 65 Fed. Reg. 34,909 (May 31, 2000)) and protect migratory birds (Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66
Fed. Reg. 3,853 (Jan. 17, 2001)). President Bush also issued three proclamations establishing the
Papahanaumokuakea (Pres. Proc. 8031; June 15, 2006), Marianas Trench (Pres. Proc. 8335; Jan. 6,
2009), Pacific Remote Islands (Pres. Proc. 8336; Jan. 6, 2009), and Rose Atoll (Pres. Proc. 8337; Jan. 6,
2009) Marine National Monuments to protect marine ecosystems of high conservation concern in the
U.S. Pacific EEZ.
266. For a complete discussion of federal common law, see Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986).
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supported by statutory or constitutional standards—have generally been best
equipped to seek remedies for public trust infringements.267 Therefore, we will
consider the potential establishment of a federal public trust doctrine through
common law, and discuss particularly how federal statutory authority would
greatly strengthen the ability of citizens and the judiciary to enforce public trust
duties.
The public trust doctrine has customarily been a matter of common law.
The early U.S. Supreme Court extolled the benefits of a common law public
trust doctrine able to adapt to the changing needs of American society: “[The
governing of the public trust] must vary with varying circumstances. The
legislation which may be needed one day for the [waterway in question] may
be different from the legislation that may be required at another day.”268 As
stated more recently by the Hawaii Supreme Court, “[t]he public trust, by its
very nature, does not remain fixed for all time, but must conform to changing
needs and circumstances.”269 The strength inherent in the mutability of the
public trust doctrine is clear. Pursuant to scientific discovery of the
interconnected and delicate nature of coastal ecosystems and increased societal
appreciation of their recreation and scenic value, the courts have been able to
expand the public trust doctrine from its traditional coverage to protecting nonnavigable tidal wetlands.270
However, depending solely on the judiciary to interpret federal public trust
duties could prove problematic. Reliance on federal common law has been in
disfavor since the 1938 U.S. Supreme Court decision Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, in which the Court held that there is “no federal general common
law.”271 But, the Court has since determined that the judiciary may invoke
federal common law if “Congress has not spoken to a particular issue.”272 In
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (1981), the Court determined that until new
federal laws and regulations “‘pre-empt the field of federal common law of
nuisance,’” federal courts can rightfully engage in settling questions of alleged
public nuisance by water pollution.273 The Court concluded, “when Congress
267. See Klass, supra note 129, at 745; see also supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text.
268. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892).
269. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000), aff’d in part and vacated
in part by In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 105 Haw. 1 (2004); see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (“In administering the trust the state is not burdened with
an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another.”) (quoting Marks v. Whitney,
491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)).
270. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1988); Rieser, supra note
60, at 406 (“The [Phillips Petroleum] opinion implicitly recognized that ecological boundaries have
replaced navigability tests in defining the doctrine’s geographic scope.”) (footnote omitted); see also
Mineral County v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 807–08 (Nev. 2001) (concurring opinion) (“[T]he [public] trust
doctrine has evolved to encompass additional public values” beyond navigation, fishing, and commerce,
including recreation and ecological uses.).
271. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
272. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).
273. Id. at 310 (citation omitted).
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addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal
common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal
courts disappears.”274
Later in the same term, the Court decided Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., in which it detailed the “‘few and restricted’” instances in
which federal courts may create federal law.275 These “fall into essentially two
categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests,’276 and those in which Congress has given the courts
the power to develop substantive law.”277 Courts looking to invoke a federal
common law must demonstrate that state law cannot resolve the issue “either
because the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately
involved or because the interstate or international nature of the controversy
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.”278
Virtually all of the key prerequisites set out in Texas Industries for the
creation of a federal common law public trust doctrine are present in the unique
governance regime of the EEZ.279 First, such law is necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests—the federal government alone (not the states) asserts
authority in the EEZ.280 Second, U.S. duties as sovereign are intimately
274. Id. at 314. But see id. at 333–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s analysis of federal
common-law displacement rests, I am convinced, on a faulty assumption. In contrasting congressional
displacement of the common law with federal pre-emption of state law, the Court assumes that as soon
as Congress ‘addresses a question previously governed’ by federal common law, ‘the need for such an
unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.’ This ‘automatic displacement’ approach is
inadequate in two respects. It fails to reflect the unique role federal common law plays in resolving
disputes between one State and the citizens or government of another. In addition, it ignores this Court’s
frequent recognition that federal common law may complement congressional action in the fulfillment
of federal policies.” (citing id. at 314) (footnote omitted)).
275. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
276. Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). The Banco
Nacional Court identified two interests that are uniquely federal: 1) “uniformity of dealings with foreign
nations” and 2) “a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal
institutions.” Banco Nacional, 376 U.S. at 427, n.25 (1964). One could argue that both of these
situations are relevant to the U.S. EEZ.
277. Id. (citing Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652).
278. Texas Indus., 415 U.S. at 641.
279. The only exception is that Congress has not expressly “given the courts the power to develop
substantive law.” Id. at 640 (citing Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 652).
280. Pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act, the states have some authority to affect federal
activity in the EEZ if it is inconsistent with their coastal zone management plans. See Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (2006). States also retain some extraterritorial authority
over fisheries operating in the EEZ in instances where there is no preemptive federal regulation (e.g.,
Fishery Management Plan) or when federal regulations are consistent with state regulations. See
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 16 U.S.C. §
1856(a)(3)(A); see also Babcock, supra note 36, at 65–68 (summarizing both sources of state authority
over activities in the EEZ and suggesting that they may be used to extend the public trust doctrine to the
EEZ); ARCHER ET AL., supra note 54, at 151 (stating that “[i]f public trust principles are incorporated
into state coastal management programs, then both federal agency activities and federally permitted
projects affecting coastal or trust lands and resources must be consistent with those principles” (footnote
omitted)).
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involved—the interstate and international nature of issues in the EEZ makes
state law inapposite. Therefore, it is appropriate to invoke federal common law
as a means of establishing the public trust doctrine in the EEZ.
Relying on federal common law, however, may not be sufficient to ensure
the full exercise of the public trust doctrine in the EEZ. There is evidence that
the public trust doctrine works best to protect trust resources when courts can
rely on a variety of authorities, including statutes and constitutional
provisions.281 In some instances, courts have declined to enforce public trust
duties in the absence of statutory authority, even if a state has codified the
public trust doctrine in its constitution.282 In other instances, courts have
declined to apply the public trust doctrine if it is not embedded in constitutional
authority.283 Another problem with developing a public trust doctrine through
common law alone, according to Professor Klass, is that “the common law
tends to operate retrospectively rather than prospectively; it is sporadic and
case-specific; . . . it must abide by common law burdens of proof and is
administered by judges who often lack specialized or scientific expertise in the
area.”284 Though her analysis focused at the state level, her contention that the
public trust doctrine is most effective when reinforced by other authorities is
germane to the discussion of making the doctrine fully effective at the federal
level.
Thus, we suggest that the most robust federal public trust doctrine for
ocean resources would be established through a combination of judicial
recognition of a federal public trust doctrine, statutory codification of a strong
suite of public trust principles, and executive action. The establishment of
mutually reinforcing judicial public trust opinions, statutory laws, and
executive orders would enable citizens, federal ocean agencies, and courts to
best apply the public trust doctrine to the long-term stewardship of ocean
resources.
281. See Klass, supra note 129, at 745 (“[B]y integrating constitutional, statutory and regulatory
standards into the public trust law of any particular state, the doctrine can work side by side with the
statutory and regulatory framework to provide incentives to protect natural resources and the
environment.”); see also Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 481, 496 (2001)
(concluding that “the modern trend of constitutionalization may propel the doctrine beyond the
theoretical constraints of its common law roots” and “the fact that the public trust is in the common law
hardly requires that it be of the common law”).
282. See Klass, supra note 129, at 717–19. See also, e.g., Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d
232, 232 (Wash. 1993) (determining that “the duty imposed by the public trust doctrine devolves upon
the State, not any particular agency thereof. Nowhere in [the Department of] Ecology’s enabling statue
is it given the statutory authority to assume the State’s public trust duties and regulate in order to protect
the public trust.”); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Wis. 1974) (concluding that the “doctrine
merely gives the state standing as trustee to vindicate any rights that are infringed upon by existing
law”).
283. See, e.g., Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 684 (N.C. 1995) (“In the absence of a
constitutional basis for the public trust doctrine, it cannot be used to invalidate acts of the legislature
which are not proscribed by our Constitution.”).
284. Klass, supra note 129, at 713 (footnote omitted).
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Indeed, at time of this writing, legislation currently pending in Congress,
the Ocean Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21st Century
Act, 285 includes language evocative of federal public trust responsibilities in
the EEZ. For instance, the bill directs, “[o]cean waters, coastal waters, and
ocean resources should be managed to meet the needs of the present generation
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.”286
The purpose statement is another example of such language:
The purpose of this Act is to secure, for present and future generations of
people of the United States, the full range of ecological, economic,
education, social, cultural, nutritional, and recreational benefits of healthy
marine ecosystems by . . . promoting ecologically sustainable ocean
resource use and management by strengthening and empowering ocean
governance on regional and Federal levels . . . .287
Though the prospects for this particular bill are uncertain, the clamor for
ocean management reform persists, and it remains important that Congress
implement public trust principles in future federal oceans legislation.
III.

A PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE FOR THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: MODERN
JUSTIFICATIONS

A.

Regulatory Realism and the Optimism of the Green Dissent

[T]he day of “final reckoning” for the doctrine is here, or soon will be, and
reliance upon it is no longer in order.288
In 1986, Professor Richard Lazarus published Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, his landmark rebuttal to Professor Sax’s public trust doctrine
thesis.289 Much had changed on the U.S. environmental regulatory landscape
since Professor Sax’s first call to arms. During the 1970s, Congress passed a
remarkable amount of environmental legislation, addressing water pollution,
285. H.R. 21, 111th Cong. (as referred to H. Subcomm. on Ins. Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife and H.
Subcomm. on Energy and Env. by H. Nat. Resources and H. Sci. and Tech. 2009).
286. Id. § 101 2(b); see also id. § 202(a) (defining the function of the Administrator of NOAA as
carrying out the mission of the NOAA in “a coordinated, integrated, and ecosystem-based manner for
the benefit of the Nation” (emphasis added)). It is worth noting that a previous draft of the bill contained
more explicit public trust language, prescribing a unified oceans policy “to better enable the various
levels of government with authority over coastal and ocean waters, habitats, and resources, and ocean
resources to fulfill their public trust responsibilities . . . .” Id. § 2(14); see also, id. § 2(5) (“[The
Congress finds the following] . . . [t]hese oceans resources are the property of the people of the United
States, are held in trust for them by Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, and should be managed
to preserve the full range of their benefits for present and future generations.”).
287. Id. at § 3; see also id. § 101(a) (“It is the policy of the United States to protect, maintain, and
restore the health of marine ecosystems in order to fulfill the ecological, economic, educational, social,
cultural, nutritional, recreational, and other requirements of current and future generations of
Americans.”).
288. Lazarus, supra note 45, at 658 (footnote omitted).
289. Id. at 631.
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pesticides, coastal zone management, fisheries, the need for marine sanctuaries,
and the protection of marine mammals and endangered species.290 Also, public
nuisance law291 was no longer quite so “encrusted” with strict conditions for
standing.292 A 1970 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court had greatly liberalized
standing requirements, enabling citizens to bring suit against the government
and private companies on the basis of any “injury in fact, economic or
otherwise” and for reasons including aesthetic, conservation and recreational
concerns.293
290. In 1970 and 1977, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in sections of 42 U.S.C.);
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in sections of
42 U.S.C.). Also, in 1970, President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91–190, 83 Stat. 852, and created the Environmental Protection Agency. See President’s Special
Message, supra note 64. In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (2006)), the Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 136 (2006)), the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 92 Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat.
1052 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–55 (2006)), and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
92–522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.), as well as the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451
(2006)). Following were the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–205, 87 Stat. 884, the
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300
(2006)), the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801–1891 (2006), the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006)), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006)),
and the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1977 (later known as the Clean Water Act), Pub.
L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 556. Finally, the 1980s began with the enactment of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, also known as the Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2006).
291. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, public nuisance is defined as
“unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B(1) (1979); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §
2.16(a) (1977) (“For the most part, public nuisance is the inland version of the public trust doctrine
although, not surprisingly, history records public trust theory being applied in the classical nuisance
context, nuisance theory being applied in the classical public trust context, and both theories being
applied together.”) (footnotes omitted).
292. See Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 485 n.45.
293. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The Court
ruled that standing is established when the plaintiff can demonstrate an “injury in fact, economic or
otherwise” and that “[t]hat interest, at times, may reflect ‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as
well as economic values.” Id. at 152, 154 (quoting Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 616 (2nd Cir. 1965)). Several subsequent cases have both restricted and relaxed standing
requirements. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972) (denying standing to the Sierra
Club because “the ‘injury in fact’ test [for determining standing] requires more than an injury to a
cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)
(granting standing to students who alleged that certain railroad freight surcharges would harm them and
their interest in the environment by making the use of recycled goods less likely); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (acknowledging that “the desire to use or observe an animal
species, even for purely esthetic [sic] purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing,” but nonetheless applying Sierra Club v. Morton’s “injury in fact” test); Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (finding that “environmental plaintiffs
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Professor Lazarus was a member of what Professor Erin Ryan later termed
the “Green Dissent,” an assortment of environmental law and property scholars
who argued that the public trust doctrine was a conservative, and ultimately
impotent, approach to comprehensive environmental reform.294 Professor
Lazarus believed that the copious environmental legislation and liberalized
standing requirements of the 1970s rendered the public trust doctrine
unnecessary and argued against its use from a number of perspectives.295 He
believed that the doctrine was inflexible, especially compared to other tools
available for natural resources protection, such as the police power.296 He also
feared that using the public trust doctrine to reach environmental ends would
pit environmental causes against property rights and ultimately prevent the
realization of environmental goals.297 He also argued that Professor Sax was
adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom
the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity”) (citing
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 U.S. 1142, 1151 (2009) (requiring
plaintiff organizations “to make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had
suffered or would suffer harm” by the Forest Service’s actions).
294. See Ryan, supra note 281, at 477. Examples of Green Dissent articles include: Richard
Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust Theory of Environmental
Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1211
(1991) (The “public trust doctrine is a wrong—or, at least, a seriously flawed—solution to our
environmental crisis. Its oversimplified answer—to regard the nation’s environmental resources as
goods held in trust—forestalled more searching reconsideration of our environmental predicament and
postponed, perhaps indefinitely, the moment when society would come to terms with environmental
problems in a serious and far-reaching way.”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 70 (2006) (arguing “[b]y restricting
the public trust doctrine to traditional trust assets, the reconstructed doctrine avoids the danger that
courts might use the doctrine as a roving mechanism to uphold a broader set of governmental
regulations. . . . A reconstructed public trust doctrine can not only reduce conservative fears but can
serve as an exemplar of common law decision-making”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental
Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 866–
67 (1996) (concerned that expanding the doctrine beyond its traditional coverage of navigable and tidal
waters would cause backlash even in those traditional arenas).
295. See Lazarus, supra note 45, at 658–60.
296. This inflexibility, Professor Lazarus thought, restricted the doctrine to protecting only the
traditional triad of public trust rights: fishing, commerce, and navigation over public trust lands. See id.
at 710–11; see also J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Working Change from Within, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 223, 228 (2006) (“In short, Lazarus argued that
because of its utilitarian purposes, the public trust doctrine was not well suited to strengthening
environmental protection law . . . [and because of] the development of vast statutory regimes for
environmental protection . . . the doctrine was not needed. [He] even declared that the ‘doctrine simply
has no place in this emerging scheme.’”) (citing Lazarus, supra note 45, at 701).
297. Lazarus, supra note 45, at 692; see also Ryan, supra note 281, at 484 (“The most prominent
concern is the relationship between the doctrine and theoretical constructions of property law. From the
right hail the vindicators of private property rights, who argue that the doctrine, in whatever form, is
incompatible with the liberal theories of property that undergird civil society. And from the left come
the more unlikely green dissenters, who, like Professor Lazarus, fear that the canonization of the public
trust doctrine as the preeminent framework of natural resource allocation analysis has robbed civil
society of the opportunity to nurture a better framework.”) (footnotes omitted); Terry W. Frazier, The
Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory, 20 VT. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1995) (arguing
that the public trust doctrine’s basis in traditional classical liberal property theory disables its ability to
combat environmental degradation effectively).
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naive to assume that the judicial bias towards environmental conservation in
the 1970s would persist,298 and that other, more stable mechanisms would be
better suited for protecting the public’s interest in natural resources in the long
term.299
More than two decades after publication of the article by Professor
Lazarus, the legal landscape has again changed. Various courts have
endeavored to limit the doctrine of standing.300 And, the federal environmental
statutory scheme enacted in the 1970s and early 1980s has not proven
uniformly adept at protecting the environment. As Professor Klass attested,
“the environmental regulatory state that has been building since the 1970s often
seems unable to even begin to address current issues of global warming, energy
needs, water pollution, and preservation of species and open space.”301
Indeed, following the development and implementation of one of the most
rigorous fisheries management regimes in the world, the 1976 MagnusonStevens Act,302 many fish populations in the U.S. EEZ experienced steep
declines. U.S. fisheries crises since 1976 include the collapse of the New
England groundfish fishery in the 1980s and early 1990s,303 the mortality of
sea turtles in Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic shrimp fisheries,304 and in
Hawaiian swordfish longline fisheries,305 and drastic declines of large sharks
and bluefin tuna.306 An environmental group has estimated that instances of
298. See Lazarus, supra note 45, at 712. And, indeed, Professor Sax’s view was not supported by
later events. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court turned hostile to environmental concerns. The landmark
case of this turning tide was Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which, by requiring courts to give
“strong deference” to agency decisions, “devastated the ability of environmental plaintiffs to challenge
agency decisions that discount natural resource values in favor of property rights and commercial
interests.” Ryan, supra note 281, at 491–92. See also Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s
Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 703 (2000)
(documenting the Supreme Court’s “apparent apathy or antipathy towards environmental law”).
299. For instance, Professor Lazarus believed that police power and administrative law were more
promising. See Lazarus, supra note 45, at 665, 679.
300. See supra note 293.
301. Klass, supra note 129, at 701. The regulatory system has also failed miserably to protect U.S.
ecosystems from invasive species. See Andrea J. Fowler, David M. Lodge, & Jennifer F. Hsia, Failure
of the Lacey Act to Protect US Ecosystems Against Animal Invasions, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T
353 (2007).
302. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891 (2006).
303. See, e.g., Andrew A. Rosenberg, Jill H. Swasey, & Margaret Bowman, Rebuilding US
Fisheries: Progress and Problems, 4 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 303, 307 (2006).
304. See generally SHERYAN EPPERLY, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. NMFS-SEFSC490, ANALYSIS OF SEA TURTLE BYCATCH IN THE COMMERCIAL SHRIMP FISHERIES OF THE SE. U.S.
WATERS & THE GULF OF MEX. (2002), available at http://www.sefsc.noaa.gov/PDFdocs/
TM_490_Epperly_etal.pdf.
305. See generally Rebecca L. Lewison, Sloan A. Freeman, & Larry B. Crowder, Quantifying the
Effects of Fisheries on Threatened Species: The Impact of Pelagic Longlines on Loggerhead and
Leatherback Sea Turtles, 7 ECOLOGY LETTERS 221 (2004).
306. See, e.g., Julia K. Baum, Ransom A. Myers, Daniel G. Kehler, Boris Worm, Shelton J. Harley,
& Penny A. Doherty, Collapse and Conservation of Shark Populations in the Northwest Atlantic, 299
SCIENCE 389 (2003); Carl Safina & Dane H. Klinger, Collapse of Bluefin Tuna in the Western Atlantic,
22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 243 (2008).
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federal fisheries mismanagement from 1994 to 2004 cost taxpayers $520
million in disaster assistance to fishermen, fishing vessel and permit buyback
plans, and habitat restoration efforts.307 In the early 1990s, two federal fisheries
scientists concluded that lost revenues due to fish and shellfish depletions
totaled $8 billion and three hundred thousand jobs annually.308
The collapse of cod populations in New England helped to prompt the
Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), the 1996 amendments to the MagnusonStevens Act.309 The SFA required regional fishery management councils to
develop plans to end all overfishing and rebuild overexploited populations.310
Further, the SFA obliged managers to base fishery management plans on the
recommendations of fishery scientists and to specify rebuilding timeframes,
which could not exceed ten years, except in special circumstances.311 The SFA
incorporated feedback mechanisms, namely that all recovery plans must be
approved by the Secretary of Commerce and that the Secretary (through the
federal fisheries management agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service)
must evaluate the status of all managed fish populations annually and the

307. MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, THE COST OF FISHERIES MISMANAGEMENT TO
TAXPAYERS AND PROPOSED MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS (n.d.), available at http://www.oceana.org/
fileadmin/oceana/uploads/dirty_fishing/Cost_of_Mismanagement_Table.pdf.
308. Michael P. Sissenwine & Andrew A. Rosenberg, Marine Fisheries at a Critical Juncture, 18
FISHERIES 6, 10 (1993); see also 142 Cong. Rec. H11418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Studds) (“Despite numerous efforts to improve the [Magnuson-Stevens Act] over the past two decades,
the sad reality [was] that the act did not prevent the current crisis in . . . groundfish stocks, a crisis for the
conservation of both fish stocks and fishing families.”); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., COURTS,
CONGRESS, AND CONSTITUENCIES: MANAGING FISHERIES BY DEFAULT ix (2002), available at
http://71.4.192.38/NAPA/NAPAPubs.nsf/9172a14f9dd0c36685256967006510cd/a04705cd1a32a13c852
56c0200653434/$FILE/FINAL+NMFS+July+2002.pdf (“It has turned out that the bounty of the sea was
more readily harvested than conserved, and the fisheries management system was forced to transition
from allocating surpluses to rationing scarcity.”). See also U. Rashid Sumaila & Elizabeth Suatoni, Fish
Economics: The Benefits of Rebuilding U.S. Ocean Fish Populations, University of British Columbia
Fisheries Centre Working Paper #2006-04, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.,
Canada (2006), available at http://www.fisheries.ubc.ca/publications/working/.
309. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 303, at 304; Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (codified as amended in various sections of 16 U.S.C.).
310. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (codified as amended
in various sections of 16 U.S.C.) §§ 106(b)(8), 301(a), 1851(a); 304(e), 1854(e). Fisheries
benchmarks—that is when a stock is overfished or is undergoing overfishing—have specific meanings
and are calculated quantitatively. See id. § 102(29). In fisheries science, an overfished state occurs when
due to overfishing the biomass of a population drops beneath the level needed to maintain “maximum
sustainable yield.” Id. Overfishing, a better measure of current fishing mortality levels, occurs when a
fishery is taking too many individuals out of a population for the population to maintain a stable
biomass. Id.
311. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 § 109, 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e) (2006). See also Carl Safina,
Andrew A. Rosenberg, Ransom A. Myers, Terrance J. Quinn II, & Jeremy S. Collie, U.S. Ocean Fish
Recovery: Staying the Course, 309 SCIENCE 707, 707 (2005) (“Ten years (twice the time the majority of
populations require for rebuilding) was chosen to avoid Draconian mandates; to help ensure that
managers actually commence rebuilding; to increase chances for success; and to minimize future
ecological, social, and economic costs.”).
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progress of all rebuilding plans biannually.312 By all accounts, the SFA should
have provided a very powerful mandate to end overfishing.313
But, by 2006, ten years after the SFA was enacted, only five percent of 67
overfished fish and shellfish populations had fully rebounded.314 Fifty-five
stocks or stock complexes were still undergoing overfishing or were
overexploited.315 Nine remaining stocks were no longer undergoing overfishing
nor were they overexploited, but they had not yet rebounded to the target
population size set by managers.316 This problematic performance by the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to rebuild depleted fish and
shellfish populations resulted from a consistent failure to end overfishing due to
changes it allowed to original rebuilding plans, which often set timeframes
longer than ten years, and to the lack of consistent monitoring and revision of
failing plans.317
However, that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act, signed into law in January 2007, stipulates
that fishery management councils must set annual catch limits and
accountability measures by 2010–2011 that are designed to eliminate all
overfishing.318 While this act provides a stronger mandate to manage fisheries
sustainably than the previous Sustainable Fisheries Act, not enough time has
passed to judge its effectiveness.
The failure of the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Act and 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act to ensure sustainable fisheries management in the United States
can be traced, at least in part, to the lack of a firm public trust responsibilities in
federal ocean waters. Both of these statutory authorities developed to govern
sustainable fisheries management neglected to incorporate explicit public trust
principles.319 As a result, NMFS has lacked a clear public trust authority, which

312. Sustainable Fisheries Act, §§ 108–109, 16 U.S.C §§ 1854(e)(1), (7) (2006).
313. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 303.
314. See id. at 305. “Full recovery” means that the population size has reached a level capable of
producing maximum sustainable yield. Id. at 305 fig.1(b). Three stocks met this criterion by 2006:
Atlantic sea scallop, Pacific whiting, and Pacific lingcod. Id. at 304. See also NE. FISHERIES SCI. CTR.,
PUB. NO. 08-15, ASSESSMENT OF 19 NORTHEAST GROUNDFISH STOCKS THROUGH 2007 vii (2008),
available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/crd/crd0815 (concluding that fully thirteen of
the nineteen regulated groundfish populations remained overfished). This report is the most recent
assessment of the status of groundfish populations in New England.
315. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 303, at 305 fig.1(a).
316. The lack of success could be attributed to a consistent failure to end overfishing: nine years
after the SFA went into effect overfishing was still occurring in thirty individual, or, 45 percent of,
managed fisheries. See id.; Safina et al., supra note 311, at 708 (“In sum, the longer managers allow
overfishing, the more depletion undermines subpopulations’ diversity, resilience, and adaptability; risks
ecosystem structure and functioning; reduces chances for eventual recovery; and raises social and
economic costs.”).
317. See Rosenberg et al., supra note 303, at 307.
318. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853(a)(15),1853(a) note (2006).
319. Commentator Sarah Newkirk posited that this was a conscious decision: “[o]ne of the main
goals of the [1976 Magnuson-Stevens Act] was to encourage fishing by American entities, and a
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would have provided an organizing mission—to manage fisheries resources in
the best interest of current and future citizens—as well as a valuable backstop
when setting catch limits and other fishing regulations. According to a study on
improving federal fisheries management in New England, political interference
with fisheries management council decisions “has been a big problem in New
England because the congressional delegation views fisheries as a constituent
issue, rather than an economic or resource issue.”320
In addition, it is likely that the lack of functioning feedback mechanisms
among the general public, fishermen, and fisheries managers has prevented
public action to enforce sustainable fisheries management.321 In introducing the
public trust doctrine as a mechanism for environmental protection, Professor
Sax had hoped that it would enable the judiciary to rein in “rather dubious
projects” that “clear all the legislative and administrative hurdles which have
been set up to protect the public interest.”322 However, when the MagnusonStevens and the Sustainable Fisheries Acts failed to impose a clear public trust
burden on NMFS, they short-circuited the ability of courts to participate in
ensuring U.S. fisheries management was sustainable. As a result, the judiciary
has tended to override federal fishery management decisions in only the most
egregious situations.323
The public trust doctrine could enhance courts’ ability to review the
natural resource management decisions of federal agencies without the

statutory assertion of public ownership [of fish and shellfish resources] would probably not have
promoted rapid development of the American fleet.” Newkirk, supra note 40, at 572.
320. H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON., & ENV’T, IMPROVING FEDERAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW ENGLAND REGION 17 (2000), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/
publications/PDF/New%20England.PDF.
321. Economists and policy analysts who have researched the causes of dysfunction in fisheries
management often point to the lack of efficiently operating feedback mechanisms that “send signals of
resource scarcity and enable effective adaptive responses” to that scarcity. Susan S. Hanna,
Strengthening Governance of Ocean Fishery Resources, 31 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 275, 278 (1999)
(Fisheries governance “must incorporate multiple objectives representing both conservation and use. It
must bring the short-term time horizons of private individuals into line with the intergenerational time
horizons of society. It must send signals of resource scarcity, and enable effective adaptive responses in
the face of uncertainty.”).
322. Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 496.
323. One memorable example of effective judicial oversight was NRDC v. Daley, in which NRDC
contested the total allowable catch limit (TAC) the National Marine Fisheries Service had set that year
for the Mid-Atlantic population of summer flounder. 209 F.3d 747, 751–52 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The TAC
was set so high that the population had less than a 20 percent chance of rebuilding to a sustainable level.
Id. at 751. The court sided with the plaintiffs, declaring that “only in Superman Comics’ Bizarro world,
where reality is turned upside down, could the [National Marine Fisheries] Service reasonably conclude
that a measure that is at least four times as likely to fail as to succeed” in rebuilding the summer flounder
population would comply with the Sustainable Fisheries Act. Id. at 754. The court ruled that any TAC
must have, at a minimum, a 50 percent chance of rebuilding the affected population. Id.; see also Pac.
Marine Conservation Council, Inc. v. Evans, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (concluding
that the “[National Marine Fisheries Service’s] failure to minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality is
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, and in violation of the [Magnuson-Stevens Act], [Sustainable
Fisheries Act], and [Administrative Procedure Act].”).
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limitations wrought by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).324 Although
there are exceptions (e.g., where expert testimony is needed to explain technical
matters), judicial review of agency actions under the APA is typically confined
to the record that is compiled by the agency itself. Moreover, so long as the
agency action is deemed reasonable and is rationally explained, federal courts
are inclined to defer to agency expertise.325 According to Professor Arnold
Lum:
Examining natural resource management issues using the public trust
doctrine . . . allows courts to engage in a more in-depth review of the
claims presented. If a claim of waste is brought as an administrative appeal
under the state’s administrative procedure act, the agency’s record forms
the evidentiary base, affording claimants little opportunity to put on their
proof. However, . . . because breach of trust claims do not require the
courts to defer to agency decisions, as would be the norm in an [APA]
appeal, judges presiding over disputes regarding natural resources will be
less constrained to adopt the agency’s point of view. Therefore, from a
citizen’s perspective, breach of trust claims to enjoin waste of public
natural resources may create a more level playing field.326
In federal public lands law, Professor Wilkinson summarized that the
public trust concept can vitally serve “as a backdrop for judicial
decisionmaking, as an aid in determining legislative intent and as a yardstick in
assessing administrative action or inaction.”327 Federal ocean resources could
benefit greatly from protection afforded via a similar public trust concept.328
All mechanisms for regulatory management require custodians for their
enforcement. These custodians require an operating principle with which to
guide and unify their approaches. In some instances, Congress and agencies
have provided the necessary guidance with comprehensive management
frameworks detailed in federal statutes and implementing regulations.329 In the
324. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1011, 60 Stat. 238, amended by Pub. L. 89-554 (Sept. 6, 1966), 80 Stat.
383.

325. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also supra note 298.
326. Arnold L. Lum, How Goes the Public Trust Doctrine: Is the Common Law Shaping
Environmental Policy?, 18 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENV’T 73, 74–75 (2003).
327. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
269, 316 (1980). Note that the common law public trust doctrine has rarely been expressly applied to
public terrestrial lands. Professor Babcock argues that this is due to the many public lands statutory
authorities that already impart public trust responsibilities on the federal government. See Babcock,
supra note 36, at 54–59, and Eric Pearson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Federal Law, 24 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. LAW 173 (2004).
328. One commentator, Sarah Newkirk, envisioned that if clearly extended to federal waters via
statutory authority, a federal oceans public trust doctrine would “clarify the public’s interest in the
resource, make public involvement in the management of the resource more accessible, [and] make
available the possibility of equitable compensation in the event that resources are obliterated.” Newkirk,
supra note 40, at 572.
329. For example, the Clean Water Act aims to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). To that end, the Act declares
that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,” subject to certain defined
exceptions. Id. § 1311(a). The exceptions include permitting programs that allow the discharge of
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case of federal ocean waters, however, neither Congress nor NMFS has clearly
taken this step. A public trust doctrine-infused oceans management regime
would realign the horizon of current fisheries management with long-term
considerations. It would also give U.S. oceans agencies the legal bedrock on
which to build ecosystem-based management—a radically different approach to
ocean governance that will require a comprehensive legal underpinning to
implement.
B.

Ecological Realism and the New Science of Ecosystem Services

There is a growing awareness that the escalating crisis in marine
ecosystems—from biodiversity losses and transformed food webs to marine
pollution and warming waters—is in large part a failure of governance.330
Science now supports a much more holistic picture of the world’s ocean
ecosystems and the services they provide than it did in the past.331 These
services include climate regulation, nutrient cycling, control of animal
populations by food web dynamics, disturbance regulation (e.g., flood control
by wetlands and mangroves), waste detoxification by wetlands, food
production, and essential habitat for ocean fauna.332 Coastal and open-ocean
ecosystems also provide recreational and cultural benefits through ecotourism,
sport fishing, and aesthetic, artistic, educational, spiritual, and scientific
values.333 Mostly untapped but likely future services include sources for wind,
tidal and current-generated electricity, as well as ocean thermal energy
conversion.334 Ocean ecosystem services have been valued at an average of

pollutants from point sources pursuant to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permits
issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or by states, 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(2006), and the discharge of dredged or fill material pursuant to permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, subject to EPA review, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). In turn, these permitting programs are
implemented by detailed regulations. See, e.g., Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for
Dredged or Fill Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.1 (2008) (explaining how dredge and fill permits can be
issued only upon certain findings that the discharge will not adversely affect the aquatic environment).
By contrast, the United States’ current approach to managing federal ocean waters lacks a unified
management framework: there are over 20 different federal agencies with overlapping jurisdiction and
missions in our oceans. See supra note 7.
330. Oran R. Young, Gail Osherenko, Julia Ekstrom, Larry B. Crowder, John Ogden, James A.
WIlson, Jon C. Day, Fanny Douvere, Charles N. Ehler, Karen L. McLeod, Benjamin S. Halpern, &
Robbin Peach, Solving the Crisis in Ocean Governance, 49 ENV’T 20, 20 (2007).
331. Ecosystem services are, simply put, the benefits humans attain from ecosystems. See, e.g.,
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at vi, 40. The importance of ecosystem services
as a concept has been widely accepted. For example, Dr. Gretchen Daily, who has written extensively
about ecosystem services and edited NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL
ECOSYSTEMS (1997), was recently inducted into the National Academy of Sciences.
332. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253, 254 (1997).
333. See id.
334. See U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 3, at 365–68.
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$21 trillion a year—approximately two-thirds of the value of all services
provided by the earth’s ecosystems.335
Just as the scientific community is starting to better understand and
endeavor to quantify the breadth and value of services provided by marine
ecosystems, oceans are experiencing increasing and multiple stressors. These
threats fall into several categories, including freshwater, sediment, nutrient, and
pollutant inputs; coastal engineering and development; direct human impacts
(e.g., noise, light pollution, and trash input, particularly plastics); aquaculture
and fishing; climate change; invasion of nonnative species; disease; harmful
algal blooms; hypoxia (i.e., low- or no-oxygen events that kill or cause the
exodus of marine animals); ocean-based pollution (e.g., marine debris and shipbased waste disposal and noise); commercial activity (e.g., shipping lanes,
anchoring structures); ocean mining; offshore development (e.g., oil platforms,
pipelines and windmills); and ecotourism.336 The decline of some ecosystem
services due to these varied hazards can lead to fisheries collapses.337 More
generally, biodiversity loss can affect primary and secondary productivity,
resource use, nutrient cycling, and ecosystem resilience (i.e., the ability to
either withstand or recover quickly from disturbances).338 In addition, the loss
of filtering and detoxification services provided by oyster reefs, seagrass beds,
and wetlands has led to beach closures, harmful algal blooms, fish kills,
shellfish bed closures, oxygen depletion, and coastal flooding.339
As a result of the greater appreciation for the services ocean ecosystems
provide and the injurious effects of human activity on those ecosystems, much
of the national ocean policy discourse today concerns devising laws and
regulations that promote what is called ecosystem-based management.
Generally, an ecosystem-based approach seeks to protect the “structure,
functioning, and key processes” of ecosystems to sustain the services that
humans want and need.340 Managing complex systems like ocean ecosystems
335. See Costanza et al., supra note 332 at 256, 259. Though their work provides only a gross
estimate, the work of Robert Costanza et al. offers important context for the worth of ecosystem
services. The global value of all ecosystem services, $33 trillion, id. at 256, was 1.8 times the 1997
global gross national product (GNP). Id. at 254, 259 (“One way to look at this comparison is that if one
were to try to replace the services of ecosystems at the current margin, one would need to increase
global GNP by at least US$33 trillion . . . . This impossible task would lead to no increase in welfare
because we would only be replacing existing services, and it ignores the fact that many ecosystem
services are literally irreplaceable.”).
336. See Halpern et al., supra note 15, at 1304–06.
337. See, e.g., Jeremy B. C. Jackson, What Was Natural in the Coastal Oceans, 98 PROC. OF THE
NAT’L SCI. 5411 (2001).
338. See Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314
SCIENCE 787 (2006).
339. Id. at 788.
340. See MCLEOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (“Specifically, ecosystem-based management:
emphasizes the protection of ecosystem structure, functioning, and key processes; is place-based in
focusing on a specific ecosystem and the range of activities affecting it; explicitly accounts for the
interconnectedness within systems, recognizing the importance of interactions between many target
species or key services and other non-target species; acknowledges interconnectedness among systems,
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in this fashion is a relatively new concept that has yet to be widely
implemented.341
Fortunately, the vast majority of services provided by the oceans originate
in relatively cohesive continental shelf ecosystems, which typically fall within
coastal nations’ EEZs.342 For example, at last estimate, 90 to 95 percent of fish
and shellfish captured by marine fisheries are from continental shelf
ecosystems.343 The fact that most services provided by oceans stem from
processes that occur within continental shelf ecosystems is not insignificant—
governance institutions already exist in most, if not all, coastal nations’ EEZs.
Thus, protecting the ecosystem services provided by continental shelf
ecosystems will not require new governance institutions, but simply a new
mandate for existing institutions to implement ecosystem-based management.
In the United States, this mandate must include incentives for collaboration
among sectoral authorities such that marine biodiversity and ecosystem
functions affected by human activities are protected.344
In the United States, this new mandate to manage for the resilience of
marine ecosystem services can be located in the public trust doctrine.
Professors J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman assert that the doctrine can be
employed even under the strictest utilitarian interpretation of its scope.345
Protecting ecosystem services essentially preserves the traditional triad of
public trust uses, i.e., fishing, commerce, and navigation.346 Since the historical
raison d’être for the public trust doctrine is to promote these public uses of

such as between air, land and sea; and integrates ecological, social, economic, and institutional
perspectives, recognizing their strong interdependences.”).
341. See Simon A. Levin & Jane Lubchenco, Resilience, Robustness, and Marine Ecosystem-Based
Management, 58 BIOSCIENCE 27 (2008); Heather M. Leslie & Karen L. McLeod, Confronting the
Challenges of Implementing Marine Ecosystem-Based Management, 5 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY &
ENV’T 540 (2007).
342. Though the boundaries between the waters of the world’s ocean ecosystems are nothing if not
porous, we now know that individual continental shelf ecosystems—called “large marine ecosystems”
(LMEs)—can be characterized by their distinct bathymetry, hydrography, and interdependent food web
ecologies. See VARIABILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS 239 (Kenneth
Sherman & Lewis M. Alexander eds. 1986); Kenneth Sherman, The Large Marine Ecosystem Concept:
Research and Management Strategy for Living Marine Resources, 1 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 349
(1991). U.S. waters are part of the Eastern Bering Sea, Gulf of Alaska, California Current, Gulf of
Mexico, Southeastern U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeastern U.S. Continental Shelf, Beaufort Sea,
Chukchi Sea, Insular Pacific-Hawaiian, and Caribbean Sea LMEs. See U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN
POLICY, supra note 3, at 63-64.
343. See VARIABILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS at 256; U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME, THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT 1972–1992: TWO DECADES OF CHALLENGE (1992), cited in
CONDITIONS & TRENDS WORKING GROUP, MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND
HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS 516 (2005), available at http://www.
millenniumassessment.org/en/Condition.aspx.
344. See L.B. Crowder et al., Resolving Mismatches in U.S. Ocean Governance, 313 SCIENCE 617
(2006).
345. Note that the Green Dissent believed the doctrine to be fatally constrained by its historic
utilitarian scope. See Lazarus, supra note 45, at 701–02; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 296, at 227–30.
346. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 296, at 228.
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trust resources, even a conservatively interpreted public trust doctrine can be
applied to protect ecosystem services.347 Professors Ruhl and Salzman reason:
[T]raditional public trust resources often contain natural capital supplying
economically valuable ecosystem services to the public; the public’s
enjoyment of those values is appropriately treated as a use of the trust lands
within the meaning of the public trust doctrine; and, therefore, the
restrictions applicable under the public trust doctrine attach to the natural
capital found on trust lands. [Thus] integrating natural capital and
ecosystem services within the public trust doctrine’s utilitarian core [will]
make it more ecological on its surface.348
Professor Ralph Johnson explained this concept in more specific terms:
[T]he right of fishery . . . is meaningless unless fish are there to be caught.
If the water is polluted, the fish die. Thus the right of fishery necessarily
includes an implied right to water quality sufficient to support the
fishery.349
Indeed, some of the language used to describe the utility of the public trust
doctrine closely tracks language used in the conversation about ecosystem
services. In 1980, Professor Sax contended that “the focus of environmental
problems is not, as is sometimes suggested, the mere fact of change, which it is
said environmental zealots cannot accommodate, but rather a rate of change so
destabilizing as to provoke crises—social, biological and . . . economic.”350 He
argued that the public trust doctrine could uniquely “identify the trustee’s
obligation with an eye toward insulating [the public’s] expectations that support
social, economic and ecological systems from avoidable destabilization and
disruption.”351 Said another way, the public holds a common expectation that
“most of its rivers will remain rivers, its lakes lakes, and its bays bays.”352 It is
equally fair to conclude that the public also expects that its rivers will continue
to function as rivers, its lakes as lakes, its bays as bays, as well as its oceans as
oceans.
The conversation about protecting ecosystem services has not been
confined to academia; some courts have also incorporated consideration of
ecosystem services into their decisions.353 For example, in Avenal v. State,
347. Id. at 232.
348. Id. (footnote omitted).
349. Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 671, 678 n.50 (1991).
350. Sax, Liberating from Historical Shackles, supra note 48, at 188.
351. Id. at 193.
352. Wilkinson, supra note 43, at 426.
353. See, e.g., Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004), Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380
(Cal. 1971). For a more complete treatment of how the concept of ecosystem services could be more
fully incorporated into the U.S. environmental policy framework, see J.B. RUHL, STEVEN A. KRAFT, &
CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (Island Press, 2007); James
Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
133 (2006); James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr., & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting Ecosystem
Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 309 (2001). See also Robin Kundis
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oyster bed lessees sued to prevent the movement of their leases to
accommodate a canal diversion project designed to restore sediment and
freshwater flow to coastal areas and rebuild coastal marshes.354 Upholding the
restoration project, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted:
[The project] fits precisely within the public trust doctrine. The public
resource at issue is our very coastline, the loss of which is occurring at an
alarming rate. The risks involved are not just environmental, but involve
the health, safety, and welfare of our people, as coastal erosion removes an
important barrier between large populations and ever-threatening
hurricanes and storms.355
Professors Ruhl and Salzman focused their discussion on ecosystem
services provided by trust lands within state jurisdictions, but their analysis
equally supports the view that the public trust doctrine is also the best
instrument with which to protect ecosystem services provided by resources
within federally controlled waters. Because resources in state waters are
coextensive with resources in federal waters, state governments cannot protect
them if the federal government does not also adequately protect those resources
within its jurisdiction. Fish populations don’t heed lines on maps, and many
commercially important species inhabit both state and federal waters over the
course of their life histories.356 State governments cannot protect their citizens’
right to fish, for example, if the federal government does not also adequately
protect fish in federal waters.357
It is apparent that the cohesive nature of continental shelf ecosystems is
well suited for a coherent management regime.358 By establishing a duty to
conserve entire continental shelf ecosystems—not just those components with
economic value, or those that fall under the aegis of state public trust

Craig, Justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Functional Approach to Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction after Rapanos, 38 ENVTL. L. 635 (2008).
354. See, e.g., Avenal, 886 So. 2d at 1091–93.
355. Id. at 1101; see also id. (noting that Louisiana’s law stipulates that the public trust doctrine be
“implemented” as a “balancing process in which environmental costs and benefits must be given full
and careful consideration along with economic, social and other factors.”) (quoting Save Ourselves, Inc.
v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La. 1984)).
356. See Michael W. Beck et al., The Identification, Conservation, and Management of Estuarine
and Marine Nurseries for Fish and Invertebrates, 51 BioScience 633 (2001) (discussing the role of
nearshore ecosystems as nursery habitat for many fish and invertebrates); see also Interjurisdictional
Fisheries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4107, November 14, 1986, as amended 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994 and
1996 (to promote and authorize funding for projects to support the management of interjurisdictional
fisheries).
357. See Beck et al., supra note 356, at 636 (listing Red Drum, Brown Shrimp, Gray Snapper, Gag
Grouper, and flounders, among others, as examples of species that live in state and federal waters over
their life histories).
358. See Heather Leslie, Andrew A. Rosenberg, & Josh Eagle, Is a New Mandate Needed for
Marine Ecosystem-Based Management?, 6 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 43, 43 (2008) (discussing
how the services provided by continental shelf ecosystems “lead naturally into discussions about how to
better align or even reinvent ocean governance and management institutions”).
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doctrines—a federal public trust doctrine could unify federal ocean agencies
with state efforts under a common ecosystem-based vision.
C.

Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Tame the Frontiers of Marine
Management: Property Rights and Marine Spatial Planning

As various ocean uses and the contradictions among them intensify . . . the
ocean will become a site for imagining and creating future social
institutions and relations, for land as well as for sea.359
The value of a federal public trust doctrine for U.S. oceans can be seen
through the lens of two particularly pressing issues today—the introduction of
property rights to fisheries management and marine spatial planning.360 Much
thinking in fisheries management today concerns implementing property rights
regimes in fisheries, in which individual fishermen or communities hold longterm rights to the benefits resulting from ocean resources.361 Marine spatial
planning—analogous to land-use planning in terrestrial settings362—is also
gaining importance, with U.S. state and regional efforts, as well as international
programs, already underway.363 There are fears, however, that with both of
these approaches governments may be selling the oceans to private interests.364
359. STEINBERG, supra note 142, at 209.
360. Osherenko, supra note 40, at 381 (“The concepts of public trust responsibilities,
intergenerational equity, ecosystem-based management, marine spatial planning, and comprehensive
ocean zoning have emerged in a twenty-first century discourse that is reshaping social institutions for
the sea.”).
361. See, e.g., Becky Mansfield, Neoliberalism in the Oceans: “Rationalization,” Property Rights,
and the Commons Question, 35 GEOFORUM 313, 325–26 (2004) (“Property rights are at the center of a
massive change in the political economy of the oceans . . . .”).
362. “Marine spatial planning is defined as “[a] process of analysing and allocating parts of threedimensional marine spaces to specific uses, to achieve ecological, economic, and social objectives that
are usually specified through the political process.” VISIONS FOR A SEA CHANGE, REPORT OF THE FIRST
INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMMISSION AND MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE PROGRAMME,
IOC MANUAL AND GUIDES, THE BIOSPHERE no. 48, IOCAM Dossier no. 4, 12 (UNESCO, Paris, 2007).
Often confused with marine spatial planning is “ocean zoning.” It is instead “[a] regulatory measure to
implement marine spatial planning usually consisting of a zoning map and regulations for some or all
areas of a marine region. Ocean zoning is an element of marine spatial planning.” Id.
363. For example, Massachusetts was the first state to mandate the development of a
comprehensive ocean management plan, which will include a spatial planning component. See 2008
MASS. ACTS ch. 114, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw08/sl080114.htm. Other
regional initiatives have investigated implementing marine spatial planning. See FARA COURTNEY &
JACK WIGGIN, OCEAN ZONING FOR THE GULF OF MAINE: A BACKGROUND PAPER 19–21 (2003). A
leading example of marine spatial planning and ocean zoning is the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park off
of Australia, which contains 344,400 km2 of zoned coastal and ocean waters, islands, and coral cays. Jon
Day, The Need and Practice of Monitoring, Evaluating, and Adapting Marine Planning and
Management–Lessons from the Great Barrier Reef, 32 MAR. POL. 823 (2008).
364. For arguments against implementing property rights regimes in U.S. fisheries, see, e.g., SETH
MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S FISHERIES? (2002); Seth Macinko & Daniel
W. Bromley, Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and
Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REV. 623 (2004). In a list of follow-up research questions to the first
international workshop on marine spatial planning (MSP), the following research priority was especially
provocative vis a vis the “first world bias” of marine spatial planning: “Acknowledge and address the
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Indeed, marine spatial planning and property rights regimes have been
perceived by some as potentially anti-conservation.365 If extended to all U.S.
waters, a public trust backstop could be essential to ensuring these programs
are implemented in the best interest of the U.S. citizenry.
A “property right” can generally be defined as “a defensible claim to a
stream of benefits arising from things and resources;” these rights can be
conferred upon individuals, companies, communities, or the state.366 The
rationale for using property rights to manage fisheries lies in the desire to shortcircuit the open-access dynamics that have often prevailed in fisheries.367 In the
absence of clear economic incentives, generally attained through some level of
property rights, fishermen have little reason to fish sustainably, and their
collective actions often deplete the resource.368 By implementing rights-based
fisheries management reforms, fishery managers seek to establish clear
economic incentives for better fishing practices by realigning individual goals
with fleet-wide profit maximization goals, as well as public conservation
goals.369

first world bias of MSP, i.e., MSP appears to be emerging from the growing need to reserve space for
semi-permanent structures such [as] wind farms, aquaculture, oil/gas platforms, . . . and other competing
activities (e.g., industrial fishing, recreation). MSP, so far, addresses these competing activities as
activities and interests of equal “actors.” In developing countries, many of these activities (e.g.,
industrial fishing, oil/gas, recreation) are not the activities of local actors. Insofar as MSP is about
dividing and allocating common property, just whose commons is being divided and allocated to whom
is vital to consider . . . .” VISIONS FOR A SEA CHANGE, supra note 362, at 72.
365. See, e.g., id.
366. See RIGHTS TO NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (Susan S. Hanna, Carl Folke, & Karl-Göran Mäler eds.,
1996) [hereinafter RIGHTS TO NATURE] (“Regimes of property rights—the structure of rights to
resources and the rules under which those rights are exercised—are mechanisms people use to control
their use of the environment and their behavior toward each other. Property-rights systems are part of
society’s institutions: the norms and rules of the game, the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction.”) (citations omitted).
367. Open-access dynamics occur when common-pool resources are not managed. Common
property scholars argue that the tragedy-of-the-commons dynamics famously described by Garret
Hardin is actually more often associated with open-access regimes. See, e.g., Fikret Berkes, Social
Systems, Ecological Systems, and Property Rights, in RIGHTS TO NATURE, supra note 366, at 87, 89
(“[T]here is general consensus that open access is not compatible with sustainability. Hardin’s herders,
whose access to the resource was free and rulemaking appeared not to exist, were functioning in an
open-access regime, not communal property.”). See also Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968).
368. See Christopher Costello, Steven D. Gaines, & John Lynham, Can Catch Shares Prevent
Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCIENCE 1678, 1679 (2008) (“If global fisheries contain large potential profits
. . . yet the profits are only realized if the fisheries are managed sustainably, why are actively managed
fisheries systematically overexploited? The answer lies in the misalignment of incentives. Even when
management sets harvest quotas that could maximize profits, the incentives of the individual harvester
are typically inconsistent with profit maximization for the fleet. Because individuals lack secure rights to
part of the quota, they have a perverse motivation to ‘race to fish’ to outcompete others. This race can
lead to poor stewardship and lobbying for ever-larger harvest quotas, creating a spiral of reduced stocks,
excessive harvests, and eventual collapse.”) (footnote omitted).
369. See id.
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Incentive-based management programs in U.S. fisheries are becoming
more widespread.370 These often involve some version of Individual
Transferable Quotas (ITQs), which are tradable privileges to catch a proportion
of the annual allowable catch in a fishery.371 By providing a secure asset to
fishers, this approach arguably furnishes an incentive for stewardship of the
resource.372 And, because the quotas are transferable (i.e., sellable), fishers
have an incentive to ensure the value of their quota remains high over time—
which can only happen if the fish population remains healthy.373 A global study
of fisheries supports the hypothesis that implementing ITQs, or some variation
thereof, in fisheries can prevent or even reverse drastic declines in fish
populations; of the 11,135 fisheries examined, the proportion of ITQ-managed
fisheries that were collapsed in 2003 was only half that of non-ITQ fisheries.374
Creating and allocating property rights in fisheries, however, is nothing if
not controversial. Commentators have highlighted theoretical concerns (e.g.,
how can fishery managers create private property rights to public assets?),375 as
well as implementation issues, such as the fair allocation of initial quota and
whether, if left unchecked, ITQ systems lead to the undesirable consolidation
of share ownership.376 The controversy concerns the extent of the rights
granted to the use of common-pool ocean resources.377 As rights-based
370. Limited Access Privilege, Individual Fishing Quota, or Individual Transferable Quota
programs, which all employ some allocation of exclusive use rights, are used to manage fisheries for
Atlantic quahog and surf clam, wreckfish, Gulf of Mexico red snapper, Pacific halibut and sablefish,
Alaska pollock, the Cape Cod hook and line, and Bering Sea tanner and king crab. OFFICE OF
SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., Limited Access Privilege
Program: Current and Expected Future Programs (2008), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/
PartnershipsCommunications/lapp/LAPPsCurrent_Expected.pdf. Fishery managers are also exploring
the possibility of implementing these programs in the Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish, Gulf of
Alaska Rockfish, Bering Sea groundfish, and West Coast groundfish fisheries. See SOUTH ATLANTIC
FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE LIMITED ACCESS PRIVILEGE PROGRAM
EXPLORATORY WORKGROUP (2008), available at http://www.safmc.net/Portals/6/SocioEcon/IFQs/
Final%20LAP%20Workgroup%20Report.pdf. However, the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act
stipulates that new Limited Access Privilege Programs “shall not create, or be construed to create, any
right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the fish is harvested by the holder.” 16 U.S.C. §
1853a(b)(4) (2006). Thus, the that new programs may not create formal property rights to fish, but only
limited, exclusive privileges to capture some part of the annual catch quota.
371. See Costello et al., supra note 368, at 1679; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
135, at 1–12 (discussing individual fishing quotas under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, including their
capacity for transferability); James N. Sanchirico & James E. Wilen, Global Marine Fisheries
Resources: Status and Prospects, 7 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 106 (2007); David Festa, Diane
Regas, & Judson Boomhauer, Sharing the Catch, Conserving the Fish, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Winter
2008, at 75, available at http://www.issues.org/24.2/festa.html.
372. See Festa et al., supra note 371.
373. Id.
374. See Costello et al., supra note 368, at 1679–80.
375. See, e.g., MACINKO & BROMLEY, supra note 364.
376. See, e.g., MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK, INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS:
ENVIRONMENTAL, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS (2004).
377. Note, however, that simply allowing some people to fish and not others (e.g., through limitedentry license programs) or a company to extract oil from an area creates and allocates property rights.
See supra notes 194–199 and accompanying text. Thus, in the form of oil and gas leases, and, to a lesser
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fisheries management plans become more widespread, the public trust doctrine
could be a vital touchstone for their responsible implementation. A 1999
congressionally mandated study of Individual Fishing Quota programs by the
National Research Council concurred:
[The public trust doctrine] reinforces concerns about the “giveaway” of
public resources to private interests. [Also], it confers on government a
continuing duty of supervision and a responsibility to choose courses of
action least destructive to trust resources.378
The public trust doctrine is equally material to the discussion of
implementing a place-based management framework to regulate the panoply of
ocean industries. There are currently thousands of stationary and floating oil
and gas platforms, pipelines, and other infrastructure in the federally controlled
seas.379 Container ship traffic is projected to double in tonnage by 2020,380 and
other industries, such as offshore aquaculture, wind farms, and liquefied natural
gas terminals, are increasingly coming online.381 Many of these enterprises
require security of investment, which generally comes in the form of leases and
exclusionary rights.382
That is, as demands on ocean space intensify, accommodating most oceanborne activities within a comprehensive management framework will require
the deliberate creation and apportionment of rights to ocean space and
degree, fishing permits, the federal government has used property rights-based mechanisms to manage
uses of ocean resources for decades. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331 (2006) (establishing the legal framework for offshore oil and gas leasing in 1953, which, as
amended, is still current law); Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1891 (2006), amended by the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104297, 110 Stat. 3559 and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization
Act of 2006, P.L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3586 (authorizing fishery management councils and the Secretary
of Commerce to develop fishing permitting programs).
378. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 135, at 39–40. See also, Tom Tientenberg, The
Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 205 (2002) (“Although the popular literature frequently refers to the tradable
permit approach as ‘privatizing the resource’, in most cases it doesn’t actually do that. One compelling
reason in the United States why tradable permits do not privatize these resources is because that could
be found to violate the well-established ‘public trust doctrine.’”).
379. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, LEASING OIL AND NATURAL GAS
RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 1 (2008), available at: http://www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/
GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf.
380. Transportation Institute, Present Status, http://www.trans-inst.org/1.html (last visited Dec. 28,
2008).
381. See Crowder et al., supra note 344, at 617.
382. “Exclusion zones,” in which the areas around the oil and gas infrastructure are closed to
fishers and recreational boaters, are standard issue, and new wind, wave, and tidal energy facilities, and
possible offshore aquaculture facilities will require such zones. See Osherenko, supra note 40, at 318–
19, 379. See also MARINE AQUACULTURE TASK FORCE, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, FULFILLING THE
PROMISES, MANAGING THE RISKS 37 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_life/Sustainable_Marine_Aquaculture_final
_1_07.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-08-594, OFFSHORE MARINE
AQUACULTURE: MULTIPLE ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN
ESTABLISHING A U.S. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 20–24 (2008).
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resources. Though harm to trust resources may be unavoidable at times,383
under the public trust doctrine’s direction, ocean managers would, at the very
least, be presumed to favor “non-exclusive, as opposed to exclusive” ocean
activities and “reversible commitments of resources over irreversible
commitments.”384 Comprehensive marine spatial planning will require the
“responsible sectoral [ocean] authorities . . . [to] work together to manage all
the human activities in a [delineated] place.”385 The public trust doctrine would
thus provide a guiding principle to these authorities with which to evaluate the
increasingly complex trade-offs among human activities in the ocean, including
wind farms versus fisheries and marine mammal protection versus defense
activities, and to ensure that “users compensate the [beneficiaries of the federal
ocean trust] through the payment of appropriate rents and royalties.”386
A conflict arises in the consideration of developing property rights
regimes—which secure access to resources for some people or enterprises, at
the expense of others—to help manage uses of public trust resources.
According to Professor Sax, the “central substantive thought in public trust
litigation” is:
When a state holds a resource which [sic] is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource
to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of
private parties.387
The tension, thus, lies between the first tenet of the public trust doctrine,
the guarantee of public access, and the management of industries that exploit
ocean resources, which often require restricted access rights.388 Or, in the
383. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (“As a matter
of practical necessity the state may have to approve appropriations [of water] despite foreseeable harm
to public trust uses. In so doing, however, the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the
effect of the taking on the public trust, and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the
uses protected by the trust.”) (citation omitted).
384. Archer & Jarman, supra note 40, at 265. See also Osherenko, supra note 40, at 367 (“As
demands for new or expanded uses of public trust resources lead to conflict, the trustee must weigh
current-use value against the interest of future beneficiaries to determine the appropriate trade-off
between current profits and long-term provision of goods and services from the public trust property.”).
385. Larry Crowder & Elliott Norse, Essential Ecological Insights for Marine Ecosystem-Based
Management and Marine Spatial Planning, 32 MARINE POL’Y 772 (2008).
386. Young et al., supra note 330, at 29; see id. (“For the U.S. populace, the [first step towards
place-based management] is to acknowledge that marine ecosystems are commons belonging to all the
people of the nation; they are public trust resources managed by state and federal governments acting as
trustees on behalf of the people as owners. . . . This status allows for a variety of human uses of marine
ecosystems but always under rules and restrictions adopted and implemented by the trustee to protect the
long-term integrity of these systems . . . .”).
387. Sax, Effective Judicial Intervention, supra note 48, at 490.
388. See Rieser, supra note 60, at 433 (“As work on this and other ideas about the public trust
doctrine continues, commentators and the courts will eventually need to reconcile the various purposes
the doctrine has come to serve. If the doctrine is broadened to include all naturally functioning
ecosystems, it may not be possible for it to serve as a vehicle for public access to all resources within its
scope. Mono Lake may need to have fewer human visitors and users if wildlife species dependent on its
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context of protected areas, for example, the tension lies between the guarantee
of public access and ecological preservation. The question arises: which public
trust right—access or sustainable management—has primacy?389 And, are
these two rights necessarily incompatible?
Bringing public trust law into the federal oceans management discussion
helps clarify that ultimately the controlling duty of the governmental trustee is
to act as a long-term steward of the public trust. Protecting public uses of trust
resources ultimately requires protecting ecosystems. In turn, protecting
ecosystems often requires limiting access to them. Under a public trust
mandate, federal ocean agencies could allocate access to marine resources as
long as the corpus of the U.S. ocean trust was not substantially impaired.
CONCLUSION

[T]he question at issue is the OUTER SEA, the OCEAN, that expanse of
water which antiquity describes as the immense, the infinite, bounded only
by the heavens, parent of all things . . . the ocean which, although
surrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the ebb and flow
of its tides, can be neither seized nor inclosed; nay, which rather possesses
the earth than is by it possessed.390
If people want both to preserve the sea and extract the full benefit from it,
they must now moderate their demands, and structure them. They must put
aside ideas of the sea’s immensity and power, and instead take stewardship
of the ocean, with all the privileges and responsibilities that implies.391

Until only recently, human society viewed ocean resources as infinite and
the ocean itself as “wild, unruly, and untamable” and “dangerous and
unpossessible.”392 The enduring legacy of this construction is the stunted ocean
governance institution.393 In the United States, a multitude of agencies manage
ecological integrity are to benefit from doctrinal advances intended primarily for humans. This and other
challenges await the many who find themselves drawn to the puzzling but compelling public trust
doctrine.”).
389. See, e.g., id. at 410.
390. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH
TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 37 (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., James Brown Scott
ed., Oxford University Press 1916) (1608).
391. Edward Carr, The Deep Green Sea, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1998, at S17, S18.
392. STEINBERG, supra note 142, at 99. For an in-depth analysis of the development of ocean
governance regimes that reaches beyond (in history and geography) the public trust doctrine, see id.; see
also GEORGE GORDON BYRON, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, CLXXIX, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
POETICAL WORKS OF LORD BYRON 81–82 (Cambridge ed. 1905) (“Roll on, thou deep and dark blue
Ocean, roll! Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain; Man marks the earth with ruin, his control
Stops with the shore . . . .”).
393. See Michael Orbach, Beyond the Freedom of the Seas: Ocean Policy for the Third Millennium,
16 OCEANOGRAPHY 20, 27 (2003), available at http://www.tos.org/oceanography/issues/issue_archive/
16_1.html (“One of the most damaging effects of the long tenure of the freedom of the seas concept has
been the de facto notion that governance rules were not needed because of human inability to cause
significant detrimental effects on the ocean—the inexhaustibility hypothesis.”).
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uses of federal ocean resources under disparate, narrowly focused statutory
authorities, without any common, overarching mandate. This governance
regime, developed decades ago, was not created with regard for ocean
ecosystems and is fundamentally unable to keep pace with the dynamics of
coupled human, ecological and oceanographic systems. Ecosystem-based
management has been suggested as a replacement framework; but ecosystem
approaches are only beginning to be implemented and, on their own, lack the
legal underpinning to catalyze effective management across federal ocean
agencies.
The public trust doctrine could uniquely provide a powerful and intuitive
framework for restructuring the way we manage ocean resources. By directing
the federal government to comply with trusteeship duties as a steward of U.S.
ocean resources, a federal public trust doctrine would provide both a unifying
concept for oceans governance and a legally recognized authority for managers
to protect ecosystems through their custodial obligation to manage resources
for the long-term benefit of the public. An expansive doctrine would also
extend the important notion of intergenerational equity seaward—inherent to
states’ public trust doctrines is the provision that trust assets must be managed
for both current and future citizens. The needs of current beneficiaries must be
met without forfeiting the needs of future beneficiaries. Living and nonliving
resources in federal ocean waters also ought to be managed consonant with this
duty.
Our contemporary understanding of the range of ocean ecosystem
services—which are concentrated in the waters of the continental shelves and
shoreward but cannot be separated by state and federal jurisdictional
boundaries—lends renewed weight to the discussion of expanding the public
trust doctrine to the outer borders of the EEZ. At the heart of our analysis are
three questions: (1) does a federal public trust doctrine exist; (2) if so, can we
rightfully extend it to include the entirety of the U.S. ocean waters; and, (3)
could the doctrine provide the missing catalyst for federal agencies to manage
the use of U.S. ocean resources in a coordinated, sustainable fashion? We have
answered each of these questions in the affirmative. In addition, we have
determined that the most robust federal public trust doctrine would be
established by a mutually reinforcing combination of judicial interpretation,
congressional mandate, and executive action.
Given the failure of the current regulatory approach, improved scientific
understanding of the interconnected nature of ocean ecosystems, and the
inexorable pressure to exploit ocean resources, there is immense value in
securing the place of the public trust doctrine in governing the way we manage
uses of U.S. oceans. We are not the first to conclude that the clear extension of
the public trust doctrine to the EEZ would help the government manage the
oceans in a more cohesive, sustainable way. But, more than twenty years after
the first rumblings about expanding the public trust doctrine to all U.S. ocean
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waters, room for improvement in U.S. ocean governance remains glaringly
apparent.
Thus, the stage is set for the public trust doctrine to be extended to the
outer borders of the EEZ. Science calls for such an extension, and current
societal values in marine natural resources demand improved feedback
mechanisms with which to enforce the common interest in the sustainable
management of ocean resources. Expanding the public trust doctrine to the
resources of the U.S. territorial sea and EEZ would establish an enforceable
duty for the federal government to manage and protect the oceans in a
sustainable fashion. It would compel a more cohesive and sustainable approach
to ocean governance for the benefit of current and future generations.394

We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@
boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.

